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REALISM, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND RELATIONALITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE .' 
Abstract 
An alarm has been sounded that historical sociology is subverting the theoretical 
aims of social science. Criticizing an array of widely influential scholars, Kiser and 
Hechter (1991) propose that rational choice theory can avoid the trend toward 
"empiricism" resulting from the import of history into sociology. K/H's position is based 
on theoretical realism--a radically antipositivist thesis that uses theoretical postulates to 
theorize about reality beyond positive appearance. Examining closely K/H's theoretical 
realism casts-doubts on the epistemological foundations of rational choice theory. Recent 
developments in relational realism, by contrast, place greater emphasis on the practical 
elements of explanation, supporting a more relational, causal-historical, and problem- 
driven view of theory. A renewed appreciation of Kuhn's historical epistemology provides 
the foundation for evaluating these competing research programs. 
30 years ago, in a remarkably prescient first sentence, T.S. Kuhn sent shock waves 
through our intellectual landscape--and forever transformed it: "History, if viewed as a 
repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation 
in the image of science by which we are now possessed ..." (Kuhn [I9621 1970:1).l More 
recently, in a stinging attack two iduential sociologists issued an alarm about just those 
social scientists who appear to have embraced Kuhn's challenge most eagerly: "The role 
of general theory in comparative-historical sociology is under attack (Kiser and Hechter 
1991:l). I juxtapose these contrary perspectives to strike a paradox: Kuhn, a physicist and 
philosopher-historian of science, turned the prevailing image of science on its head by 
demonstrating the wrongheaded denial of history in the construction of theory. Thirty 
years later, Kiser and Hechter (K/H) build firmly on the foundations of f ihn 's  legacy to 
express alarm over the dire consequences of taking up Kuhn's mandate; the profligate use 
of history, they charge, is subverting theory. This is a paradox that needs explaining: How 
is it that two historical sociologists can stand on Kuhn's shoulders and denounce the use 
of history when it was Kuhn himself who changed our understanding of history and theory 
. . ., 8 . -  -. .:=. by demonstrating its centrality? 
r,., 
At a time when increasing numbers are taking "the historic turn in the human sciences" 
4. . 
(McDonald 1996), this question touches on some of the most critical and contested issues 
-. . ,, 
. facing not just historical sociology but the social sciences across the board. For one, K/H 
criticize all research that is not theory-driven, or "guided" by "general theory" 
(p.2,16,17,22), and thus make it clear that their specific concerns about historical sociol- 
ogy are less important than their more general calling into question the worth of allprob- 
lem-driven research and their skepticism about what they call "empiricism." Second, 
K/H's is not an isolated idiosyncratic critique of comparative historical sociology but part 
of a wide-reaching research program of rational choice theory with many such targets 
against so-called "anti-theoretical empiricism" (Almond 1988; Hechter 1992; Shepsle 
1992). That K/H invoke rational choice not merely to exemplify but as the only theory to 
date that meets their criteria (p. 23), is thus another reason for the general significance of 
this discussion. Rational choice--and its ancillaries such as game theory and principal- 
agent theory--is among the fastest growing theories in social science, and has itself 
changed the parameters of recent debate. Examining specifically K/H's argument thus 
serves more generally to clanfy the epistemological foundations of one of the most in- 
fluential theoretical developments of our time. Finally, this discussion transcends 
parochialism because K/H don't chastise only a few well-known historical sociologists, 
but some of the most highly respected scholars across the social sciences--not just Michael 
Mann, Theda Skocpol, and Charles Tilly, but also Reinhard Bendix, Kai Erickson, 
Anthony Giddens, Robert Nisbet, Arthur Stinchcombe, Guy Swanson, Irnmanuel Waller- 
stein and, no less than "contemporary survey research in sociology" (p.16). Surely if this 
wide spectrum of scholars is threatening the discipline, we would all do well to take 
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notice. 
K/H chargeShistorical sociology is'"empiricist," wrongly "inductivist," innocent of the 
importance of "causal mechanisms in adequate explanation," and subversively 
"antitheoretical." Instead of waging a defense, already done forcefully by Quadagno and 
Knapp (1992) and Skocpol(1994), in this article my primary aim is to turn the tables and 
examine the foundations of K/H's own position: By what principles of knowledge do they 
justify their criticisms? And are we convinced by those principles? Since, moreover, 
K/H's accusations are spun on the terms of historical sociology being "antitheoretical," 
neglectful of "mechanisms," too descriptive in their use of "history," and naive of the tri- 
umph of deductivist "general theory," then how we evaluate their criticisms fully depends 
on whether we accept their definitions of these terms in the first place. The questions I 
put to K/H, then, following their own criticisms, are: 1) What, indeed, should count as an 
"adequate" social science explanation? If theorizing causal mechanisms is the criteria for 
success, and mechanisms are unobservable, how do we know a successful explanation (i.e. 
based on mechanisms) when we cannot see them? 2) How do we judge among rival 
theories, and do they give us good reasons to believe in their theory? 3) And, ultimately, if 
"general theory" is the criterion for success, and "history" the antithesis of theory, what 
counts as "theory" and "history" in the first place? At stake, I believe, if we accept their 
answers to these questions is the epistemological status not just of history but of social 
science tout cours. Are theories to be constructed and judged exclusively by theory-driven 
standards (as per K/H), or (as I insist) should theories be problem-driven, and judged by 
grappling with the difficult question of what--beyond the elegance of theory itself--makes 
an explanation convincing? 
In this article I address these issues through a three-part strategy: the first, a focus on 
Kuhn and the Kuhnian legacy; the second, a critical focus on K/H (1991); and third, an 
outline of an alternative to K/H's position. It is in examining K/H's theory-centric 
justifications for rational choice theory that my argument about the paradox, and the im- 
portance, of the Kuhnian influence becomes so important. For rational choice's current 
epistemological foundations--specifically its insistence on the necessity of, and the 
justification for, using an exclusively deductivist and exogenous (not subject to prob- 
lematization) "general theory" to impute otherwise unobservable causal mechanisms --is 
part of an trajectory made possible largely by the Kuhnian revolution.* I will argue addi- 
tionally, and paradoxically, that a slightly different trajectory out of the same Kuhnian 
corpus provides the most convincing alternative to K/H's model. This alternative is based 
on a historical epistemology, and it also supports theorizing causality--but with a concep- 
tion of theory not as either deductive or inductive but as problem-driven, relational, and 
historical. 
It is in considering these contending appropriations of Kuhn in theorizing causality 
that we confront the paradox that both positions stem from what philosophers call 
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scientific redkm--the thesis that unobservable phenomena ("theoretical entities"), such as 
atoms and quarks, market forces or individual preferences, despite the absence of positive 
(observable) evidence for their existence are "real" enough to be used as explanatory in 
theoretical accounts. Scientific realism does not fit neatly into either side of the several 
dichotomies around which K/H frame their attack--between theory. and interpretation, 
between positivism and historicism, between their correct use of deductivism and the 
naive inductivism practiced in historical sociology. But K/H have framed wrongly the 
terms of debate and their position in it, for these are not the fundamental issues at stake 
in their argument. At issue in K/H's rational choice-based attack on historical sociology is 
a less familiar but no less significant contestation over scientific realism. Induction and 
deduction are both logics of positivism; rational choice theory, by contrast, rests on a 
realist thesis and is by definition of its insistence on imputing causal mechanisms from 
theoretical postulates a militantly antipositivist enterprise. Only realism accepts that 
causal mechanisms--despite being unobservable--can be used as the basis of explanatory 
theoretical accounts. Thus while scientific realism may seem like an arcane concern to 
some, any talk of causality (like that of K/H's and my own) that reaches beyond correla- 
tion and statistical probability into the territory of mechanisms ("meaningful connection 
between events as the basic tool of description and analysis".[Coleman 1986: 13271) cannot 
avoid confronting the challenges of realism. 
Questions about what we can legitimately claim to be "real" have, in fact, always 
been at the epicenter of social science inquiry--not for reasons of metaphysical discourse, 
but for reasons of explanation and trust in a theory. The crux of it is two-fold: First, how 
can we theorize about--i.e. ascribe causality to--that which is unobservable, be it price me- 
chanisms, maximizing preferences, class consciousness, or domination? It is precisely be- 
cause connective mechanisms are unobservable--unlike correlations of empirical 
indicators--that positivism has militantly rebuked their inclusion in the realm of scientific 
theory. That this rebuke has held firm in mainstream conceptions of science is 
incontrovertible--to wit, the ability of tobacco companies withstand legal liability on the 
grounds that no positive evidence has yet been found to prove not just that smoking is as- 
sociated with but actually c a k s  ~ a n c e r . ~  
As per Coleman (1990), rational choice rightly rejects this rebuke, and rightly insists 
that conjunction and statistical proabability cannot substitute for connective mechanisms 
in any true account of causality (see also Elster 1989). By insisting on mechanisms, how- 
ever, rational choice must face up to the second issue at stake in realism, namely the long- 
standing positivist demand (also rightly justified) for accountability.. What warrants accept- 
ing .as true even well-structured and parsimonious explanations that rely on constructs 
which, since we cannot observe them, we have no sure reason for believing in them? It 
was for very good reasons that positivism took on the heavy burden of demanding positive 
evidence for theoretical claims; without it, we are susceptible to all and any prejudice . 
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passing under the guise of science. Their challenge 'is still justified: Why we should believe 
in any social science theory--however elegant or parsimonious--that explains by reference 
to unobservables, is a question to which we still are owed an answer, and to which all 
theories that traffic in mechanisms must be accountable if they are not to thrive as mere 
prej~dice.~ 
The purpose in bringing attention, then, to what I argue is rational choice's underly- 
ing theoretical realism--the thesis that belief in an explanation depends on belief in the a 
priori theory from which it is imputed--is to call its advocates explicitly to account. K/H, in 
the end, dodge this responsibility: They give us no good reasons for why we should believe 
their version of reality. The advantage of even asking for accountability, however, is that 
the question may provoke further epistemological reflection on all sides of the issue; I 
certainly hope so. In the meantime, my view of rational choice's theoretical realism 
shares much with Harrison White's rather pugnacious conclusion that rational choice rests 
on "an underlying ontology of 'spirits' ... upon angels, that is, upon spirits both disembodied 
and independent ...[ the] goals or preference orderings ... essential to ... rational choice, are 
appropriate and relevant only to entities which are inertial as well as isolate--angels, in 
short" (White 1992:301). Since most of us are not angels, perhaps we need a realism for 
the rest of us. 
A Note on Kuhn: My argument is in part devoted to a reinterpretation of Kuhn's work. It 
is oddly unfashionable to focus on Kuhn these days--odd since Structure is "probably the 
most influential work ever written in the philosophy of science" (Lloyd 1993:207).~ So 
much has Kuhn passed tacitly into our knowledge culture, however, that his work is some- 
times less examined than invoked as the crucial point of reference in all discussion of 
recent transformations in the social sciences--from epistemology to postmodernism. A 
rethinking of Kuhn and a reconsideration of his legacy, therefore, may even be more im- 
portant as its explicit retreat out of graduate syllabi subjects it increasingly to appropria- 
tion without consideration. So I begin with an--admittedly--unorthodox argument: The 
legacy of Structure is the challenge to rethink theory-construction through the lens of an 
historical epistemology. The unorthodoxy is purposeful;-on the occasion of his recent 
death it is fitting to revisit directly the question of Kuhn's significance by exploring what I 
propose to be crucial to current debates over rational choice theory--his paradoxical 
duality of influence. 
I: THE KUHNIAN CHALLENGE: Beyond Induction versus Deduction 
When Kuhn published Structure, the "image of science" by which [philosophers 
were] ...p ossessed" was dominated by positivist epistemology. Epistemology, in the generic, 
is concerned with how we know, or why certain theories are justified and declared "win- 
ners," whereas others barely survive their birth; positivist epistemology, in particular, pres- 
cribes rules and empirical foundations for distinguishing true knowledge from wrong- 
headed speculations or "mere" belief. At the time of Kuhn's intervention, positivists 
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debated over whether induction or deduction was the correct logic for con f i i ng  a 
theory. Kuhn's analysis of the image of science showed the differences between them to 
be less important than their similarities. Most famously, he pointed to their mutual 
grounding in the foundational premise of modem science--the sharp delineation between 
theory and observation; between the self-evident, pre-theoretical existence of empirical 
reality on the one side, and what are unobserved, hence merely theoretical, "ideas" about 
reality on the other.For both the logics of induction and deduction, observation is the final 
adjudicator in confirming or disconfirming a theory. 
Drawing from the history of science, Kuhn questioned the theory- and method- 
independent status of observation. In so doing he brought the term "paradigm" into com- 
mon academic parlance to sigmfy a world view that frames not just particular theories but 
also the questions considered worth asking in the first place and the rules by which they 
can rationally be an~wered.~ Kuhn showed that what science has considered as confirming 
evidence has been influenced by what our dominant paradigms allow us to see and, most 
especially, to care about. This in turn suggested that the debate between induction and 
.- deduction could be seen as a false dichotomy held together by a misleading assumption 
. - 
that knowledge progresses by applying the correct logic of theory-evidence relations. 
Rather than winning or losing on the grounds of logical rules about theory-evidence con- 
firmation, Kuhn showed those theories that actually have been accepted as explanatory 
are those which have unseated the available competitors in the field (p.144-45). History 
shows th& it takes a theory to beat a theory. 
The Kuhnian Revolution: A Theoretical or a Historical One? 
Kuhn proved to be most prescient; the impact of the "Kuhnian revolution" was cataclys- 
mic (e.g. Gutting 1980). The transformation it brought, however, is neither obvious nor 
singular as Kuhn, like all influential thinkers, has been subject to a multiplicity of ap- 
propriations. There is: Kuhn #1: The Kuhn accused of "relativism," and "mob psychology"; 
Kuhn #2: The Kuhn of the history of science and scientific revolutions; Kuhn #3: The 
"theory-centric" Kuhn; and Kuhn #4: The Kuhn who outlined an historical epistemology. 
Kuhn #1 and #2, among the most debated topics in the last twenty-five years of scholar- 
ship are not the focus of this article. Kuhn #3, the chief focus of my critique, I argue to 
be the Kuhn of rational choice theory. Kuhn #4, relatively neglected, is the Kuhn from 
which rational choice can be challenged, and who provides a renewed appreciation for 
problern-driven research and the centrality of history in the construction of knowledge. 
'Theory-centrism" (Kuhn #3) is the term for the interpretation of Kuhn that focused al- 
most exclusively on his apparent blurring of the fact/theory distinction--a distinction that 
"positivism made so important ... it was certain to be denied (Hacking 1983: 170). The in- 
strument of denial was misreading Kuhn to have said that observation is nothing but 
theory, and science thus exclusively theory-driven. But Theory-centrism wrongly conflates 
into one dimension what are three separate aspects of the postpositivist critique. The first 
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is the quite reasonable, but banal, point that no research can take place without some 
proportion of deductive reasoning, especially to generate new experiments and new 
measuring instruments. To hold this position, however, is simply to recognize that we go 
armed with ideas and postulates, not solely to test a theory about the phenomena under 
scrutiny, but also to have principles for selecting data or to generate causal analogies 
(Stinchcombe 1978) that can be tested in turn.7 The second extends problematically to the 
social sciences the reasonable argument that since (in natural science) there is often no 
significant distinction between observable and unobservable entities, they can legitimately 
be used interchangeably in theory. The third wrongly extends the justified critique of the 
possibility of pure theory-independent passive reporting of facts to all research practices 
not exclusively driven by deductivist logic. 
The flattening of these into one grand theory-centrism created a gestalt-like change in 
the image of science: The wrongheaded privileging of "brute fact" was suddenly replaced 
with a new hegemony of "the primacy of theory" (for correctives, see Pickering 1989, 1990, 
1992a, 1992b, 1993; Hacking 1983,1992; Galison 1987,1989; Gooding 1992; Gooding et. 
al. 1989). Suddenly it appeared that philosophers had closed the door to reasoning that 
did not accept what was now an aggressively anti-empirical, dogmatic version of deduc- 
tivist logic--"theory proposes; theory disposes." Overnight science was rewritten to reflect 
this new theory-driven story in which experimental practices were demeaned and observa- 
tions demoted to mere "illu~trations."~ When such new stories concluded with ordinary 
positivist morality tales about experiments "confirming the theorists' speculations" they 
still converged safely with the empirical foundations of deductivism. But it was an easy 
slide from there to the hegemony of theory tout cows in which talk of evidence and rea- 
soning other than "theory-driven" came to be seen as "empiricist," "naive inductivism." 
Declared by theory-centrists to be nothing more than passive empiricism, experiment--so 
long a driving force in the construction of phenomena not merely the passive reporting of 
facts--was now denied an independent role in theory building (Hacking 1983:159-161, 
171). Most ironically, in light of Kuhn's original mandate, history--long the epistemologi- 
cal "Other" of positivism--became as much a casualty of the new theory-centrism as it had 
been of pre-Kuhnian philosophy. 
RETHINKING THE KUHNIAN LEGACY: AN HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
Kuhn's contribution, I think, should be seen elsewhere--as adumbrated in the first 
sentence of Strucare where he argued not against the exclusion of theory, but of hi~tory.~ 
He thus posed the challenge of an historical epistemology, a term I use to capture the 
deeply controversial thesis that the history of a thing (and not just the logic of its construc- 
tion) can tell you something fundamental about its nature. The term is purposefully 
oxymoronic: It intentionally challenges the assumed anti-historical quality of episte- 
mology--the rules and criteria for valid standards of truth--and instead proposes that all of 
our knowledge, our logics, our presuppositions, indeed our very reasoning practices, are 
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indelibly, (even if obscurely) marked with the signature of time. They are "history-laden1'-- 
a phrase meant to evoke, to disturb, and to invert, the well-known claim that all data are 
"theory-laden," and to draw attention to the less discussed inverse--namely, that all social 
and political theory is founded on presuppositional historical claims. In what follows I use 
the term to cover three neglected but crucially important aspects of the Kuhnian legacy: 
his focus on problem-driven sources of knowledge; his notion of articulation in research 
practice; and his implicit demonstration of path-dependency and causal narativity in ex- 
planatory structure.lO 
(1) Problem-Formation in Theorv Construction 
As an element of his mandate to go beyond the induction/deduction dichotomy, Kuhn 
indeed argued that theories are defeated only by competing theories--not just disconfirm- 
ing data. But he did not stop there; he looked to the history of science to understand why 
certain theories were even considered candidates for truth in the first place (1970:144-59). 
There he found that the most significant factor in determining the spectrum of competing 
theories was the set of contemporary questions to which the theories were vying to be the 
winning answer. This laid the groundwork for what was perhaps Kuhn's most important 
contribution--his challenge to positivism's exclusion of the significance of problem- 
formation in epistemology (Kuhn 1970:8-9). Philosophers of positivism make a fundamen- 
tal distinction between what they call the logic of justification and the context of discovery 
(Reichenbach 1962; Hempel 1966:3-18; Popper 1962:42-59). Discovery is the context in 
which we "discover" problems-to-be-answered, and the circumstances surrounding the ini- 
tial formulation of the hypotheses we generate to answer them. It is the generative mo- 
ment in which we discover and decide what is worthy of problematizing in the first place. 
Philosophers considered the context of discovery to be purely "subjective" (based on 
psychological propensities of the individual scientist, etc) and thus of no bearing what- 
soever on the validity of a hypothesis. The context of justification, by contrast, is limited to 
the formal logics of methodology, or the correct means for verifying and structuring 
hypotheses--are they supported by the evidence? confirmed by experiment? corroborated 
by stringent testing? (Hacking 1983:6). .Since the question of truth and acceptability 
rested in justification alone, positivist philosophers charged that to confuse discovery with 
final adjudicating method and logic was to commit the "genetic fallacy." That meant 
wrongly mixing up history--the "origins" of a theory--with its final logical truth. 
Kuhn's use of history challenges as indefensible the separation between logic and dis- 
covery; doing so, he suggests, actually created false ideas about how knowledge is con- 
stituted and truth decided upon: "I may even seem to have violated the very influential 
contemporary distinction between 'the context of discovery' and the 'context of justifica- 
tion.' Can anything more than profound confusion be indicated by admixture of diverse 
fields and concerns? Having been weaned intellectually on these distinctions and others 
like them, I could scarcely be more aware of their import and force. For many years I 
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took them to be about the nature of knowledge ... Yet my attempts to apply, even grosso 
modo, to the actual situations in which knowledge is gained, accepted, and assimilated 
have made them seem extraordinarily problematic" (Kuhn 1970:8-9). Once history showed 
that theories are tested against competing theories, the logic/discovery distinction proved 
untenable for Kuhn because it is the historical context of discovery that determines the spec- 
trum of theories available for comparison at any point in time. Why, for example, at T2 rath- 
er than at TI, does theory A win out over the field of competitors [A, B, C...]? Kuhn's 
answer was that for historical reasons theory A could appear to be justified in the field of 
theories [A, B, C] available for comparison, but look not at all justified if the field of 
available theories is or was [A, D, F] (1970:23,94-110, 144-159). 
Two key insights can be extrapolated from Kuhn's focus on problem-formation. First, 
because scientists ask different questions at different points in time--in part because of 
prior questions asked--different answers also satisfy them at different points in time. 
Theory [A] may beat [B] at time TI but lose to [B] at time T2 because the questions may 
have changed (1970:102-106). Thus, for example, Galilee's science was accepted at the 
exact moment when changes in artillery made it urgent to figure out where cannonballs 
would land and how far they would travel with a given amount of gunpowder. Historical 
exigencies can bring certain questions into existence in the first place. "Civilizational con- 
cerns" (Zald 1990) post-1989, for example, explains why social scientists now problematize 
democratization at a level of intensity completely absence only ten years earlier, thus 
bringing new candidates (e.g. Putnam 1993) or recycling ones once thought moribund 
(e.g. social contractarianism) into the field of contending theories. That means that con- 
tained within the theory is the temporality of the question, and a confirmed theory at TI  
may well be subject to future disconfirmation at T2 when pressed by a different kind of 
problem. This does not suggest that there is no best theory; rather, that a certain humility 
is necessary in the face of any winning one (Kuhn 1970: 198-200,209-210). 
Arguably, Kuhn anticipated the reply from skeptics: It is an accident when we find 
the best theory because, if the full field of logically possible theories [A, B, C, D, F] had 
been up for comparison, there could have been only one winner; furthermore, that one 
winner would have won in relation to any subset of those theories (1970:171-72). An ans- 
wer to these criticisms can be drawn from the second major implication of his focus on 
problem-formation and the historicity of scientific justification: The adjudicative status of 
facts and evidence depends upon the temporal context in which it is discovered; indeed 
the epistemological significance (degree of importance in confirming or rejecting a 
theory) of the same pieces of fact and evidence could be completely at odds depending 
upon the historical moment and context. For example, potentially disconfirming facts or 
"anomalies"-- pieces of evidence that are incorrigible vis a vis a theory/prediction --vary in 
their importance depending on the point in time the data are observed. In a period of 
'horrnal science" an anomaly is treated not as a refutation of the theory but as an invita- 
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tion to further develop the theory to accommodate the observation (or sweep it under the 
rug, sight unseen). In a moment of scientific "crisis," however, the very same piece of evi- 
dence can assume an entirely different historical significance and can be used to refute 
the theory, frequently creating confusion and disarray among its former defenders 
(1970:97-98). The status of anomalies is also affected by the historical discovery of new 
anomalies: If a theory is suddenly inundated by an onslaught of new anomalies some pre- 
vious anomaly -- once considered minor or merely a "problem of measurement" -- may 
suddenly be used as major evidence to how terribly a theory has failed (197052-91). 
Contrary to the prescriptive rules that exclude history from questions about the accep- 
tance of knowledge, Kuhn's historical investigations suggest that theories are rarely ad- 
judicated primarily on the basis of the logics of justification--whether inductive or deduc- 
tive (1970:3,26,94-95). Rather, the historical processes of problem-formation appears to 
be driving knowledge: Only in response to a particular question are facts transformed into 
"evidence" at all, and that a particular question was being asked was itself a matter of his- 
torical moment (Kuhn 1970: 103; Collingwood 1970 [1939]; Somers 1996a). Standard 
epistemology declared that matters of truth are .decided by purely logical procedures that 
are unaffected by historical circumstance; subject matter data may be historical, but the 
foundations for knowledge are themselves outside of time. Yet here was Kuhn showing 
that in practice the criteria for justification have varied historically: Why a theory is con- 
firmed at one time and not another requires a historical and causal explanation, rather 
than a strictly logical one, as "changes in the standards governing permissible problems, 
concepts, and explanations can transform a science" (Kuhn 1970:106). 
t articulation" in Research Practice 
Kuhn's demonstration of the epistemological centrality of problem-formation and his 
critique of the induction/deduction dichotomy shows the great failure of the theory- 
centric reading of Kuhn to distinguish between "empiricism" and the altogether different 
order of experimental activities. In this confktion of experiment into a passive 
empiricism, theory-centrism mistakenly combined two separate activities -- "reporting" 
(via passive representation of observations) and "doing" and "causing" (via intervening) 
(Hacking 1983:173; Humphreys 1988,1989) -- into the single and justifiably vulnerable 
concept of passive accumulation of data. Unnoticed, apparently, by the theory-centrists is 
that Kuhn was equally critical of claims for disproportionately deductivist logic, as history 
also demonstrates that the relative import of general theory-driven testing has been radi- 
cally exaggerated (1970:23-33). The reason for this is simple: "there are seldom many 
areas in which a scientific theory can be directly compared with evidence" (p.26, emphasis 
added). Science reveals many avenues to pathbreaking knowledge; testing theories by ob- 
serving only the phenomena designated by a preexisting hypothesis is only one such ave- 
nue. 
Indeed Kuhn suggested that the most common type of research practice was what he 
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called articulation: "a paradigm [theory] is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an 
accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for articulation and specifica- 
tion under new or more stringer conditions" (1970:23). The analogy to the common law is 
telling; for like 0.W.Holmes7 (1903:l) famous excoriation that law is "made" by judges 
rather than applied through logic (the "life of the law" is not logic but "experience"), Kuhn 
is suggesting that new theory is constructed not through "applying" the logic of deduction 
but through the encounter of theory with historically changing problems. In this effort to 
capture the research process through the term "articulation," Kuhn, like Holmes, is chal- 
lenging the priority of abstract rules of logic over the historical construction of 
knowledge--apparently building from the original meaning of "historical" as "inquiry" and 
"learning by doing" (OED 1954567; Hacking 1983:4). Experimenting through articulation 
"can resemble exploration" (p.29), "more than any other sort of normal research, the prob- 
lems of paradigm articulation are simultaneously theoretical and experimental" (Kuhn 
1970:33). Articulation includes "resolving some of its [the paradigm-theory's] residual am- 
biguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn at- 
tention ... manipulations of theory undertaken, not because the predictions in which they 
result are intrinsically valuable, but because they can be confronted directly with experi- 
ment" (p.27,30). In a direct challenge to the possible hegemony of either induction or 
deduction, he stresses that "the need for work of this sort [articulation] arises from the im- 
mense difsiculties often encountered in developing points of contact between a theory and na- 
ture" (p.30, emphasis added). Not surprisingly, articulation can also radically transform ac- 
cepted logics. In Galileo's time, for example, previously unencountered historical and . 
practical exigencies induced methodological instabilities; where scientists were once 
satisfied with qualitative explanations, they may suddenly have demanded accurate 
quantitative predictions with the introduction of cannonballs. Kuhn's discussion of 
articulation was brief and only suggestive; the challenge he posed was to take this sugges- 
tive notion and nurture it. 
(3) Kuhn's Emlanatorv Challenge 
Kuhn is usually read as challenging only the logical rules of theory confirmation--hence 
the incessant worries about his fostering of "irrationality" and "relativism." But recall that 
Kuhn demonstrated that the criteria for theory acceptance had varied throughout history 
by constructing an empirical causal explanation that gave a convincing alternative 
account--an explanatory theory, in short--for how and why science developed the way that 
it did. Thus while he did not explicitly prescribe an alternative set of rules for the correct 
structure of an adequate explanation, Kuhn's explanatory account of western science is so 
powerful that I believe it can be read as a peqormative demonstration and answer to 
epistemology's central methodological question, namely how does a set of hypotheses, if 
true, explain why something happened? 
At the time of Kuhn's writing philosophers almost uniformly advocated the 
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deductive-nominological (D-N) method, or the "covering law" model of explanation, in 
which an explanation is derived as an instance of a conditional proposition stating empiri- 
cal regularities (Hempel 1965247-248; Cartmight 1983; Miller 1987; Outhwaite 1988; 
Salmon 1988).11 How something happens must follow deductively from the conjunction 
of sentences describing laws and initial conditions, which is expressed in the logical model 
of those conditions. Because theories are "covered" by deductive laws (hence the "cover- 
ing law" model), prediction and explanation are considered to be subsumed under the 
same logical process; explaining the past and predicting the future involves the same op- 
eration. Most notable, but too often unnoticed, about the D-N model, is its necessary and 
emphatic rejection of "causality" as a component of a nomothetic (general and theoreti- 
cal) law. Causality in this sense refers not to laws based on regularities but to the specific 
mechanisms that causes X to lead to Y. According to a strict positive logic derived from 
Hume (1938), theorizing about causal mechanism was ruled non-scientific because actual 
causal pathways and mechanisms can never be positively observed; only correlations or 
regular conjunctions of events are scientifically grounded in observation. It was this re- 
jection of underlying causal structures (because considered "theoretical entities") that 
made it possible to combine in a single set of conditional laws both prediction and 
explanation--explanation, in this account, was limited to a deduction from empirical regu- 
larities (Hempel 1965:359).* 
By giving us a story about the development of science, Kuhn introduced 
temporality and historicity as category of explanation and demonstrates the limits to the 
covering law model. Because it subsumes temporal mechanisms under the rubric of 
predictive universal laws, it cannot disclose the underlying causal mechanisms underwrit- 
ing chains of events (e.g. "enchainment," Abbott 1993, 1995; Coleman 1986: 1327); it can- 
not allow for the contingency of outcomes or explain how sequences and spatial patterns 
matter (e.g. Arninzade 1992; 1992; Griffin 1992, 1993); it searches only for similarities, 
not variations and processes (Tilly 1995a). The result is that time and space become an 
empty "picture frame" (the scope parameters) in which the real action--now assigned to 
laws--takes place. But the results could be nonsensical, as Kuhn ironizes: "Can Newtonian 
dynamics really be derived from relativistic dynamics?" (1970:lOl). Kuhn's explanatory ac- 
count of western science can, by contrast, serve as an implicit template for understanding 
how causal explanations, to be effective, must be temporally and narratively constructed. 
A successful explanation, one intended to account for how and why scientific knowledge 
developed could not be constructed through logical deductive entailment under universal 
laws but only through a causal historical narrative establishing causal chains and rela- 
tional structures. A given theory not only has a history, but is a history--at each stage its 
bears the residue of its previous history, of a series of encounters with confirming or 
anomalous evidence (MacIntyre 1980). Kuhn described what he considered to be the 
teleological logic of the covering law approach as "stages toward a set goal, a permanent 
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scientific truth" (1970: 173). His own causal historical account, by contrast, he depicted as 
"movement from beginnings but toward no goal": "We are all deeply accustomed to seeing 
science as the one enterprise that draws constantly nearer to some goal set by nature in 
advance. But ... can we not account for both science's existence and its success in terms of 
evolution from the community's state of knowledge at any given time?" (p.172,171). 
Kuhn's analysis gave new life to an old suspicion: That an explanation intended to 
account for how and why something happened--and not just for predictive purposes--can 
only be established through causal chains and mechanisms.13 It has even been argued 
recently that the relational absences built into the covering law model actually undermine 
its capacity to present a true explanation (Cartwright 1983, 1989). Striking implications for 
the epistemological status of temporality and process can thus be derived from Kuhn's 
demonstration that a successful explanation could not work through logical deductive 
entailment. Most notably, it makes clear that there are alternatives to the covering law 
model that are more than non-theoretical, particularizing, and "story-tellingM--that is, 
"merely historical." Put slightly differently, alternative methods such as path-dependence 
are historical, but Kuhn gave history a new epistemological status in.the construction of 
theory. 
WHAT IS HISTORY? 
When Kuhn wrote Structure, the dominant image of history in science as merely "anec- 
dote or chronolo gy..." (Kuhn 1970:l) was mirrored in the social sciences, long divided be- 
tween interpretism and positivism (Ape1 1984; Hollinger 1980). Although apparently at 
complete odds, arguably what kept them joined in battle for so long were mutually carica- 
tured depictions of each other. For both positivists and interpretivists, science was a mat- 
ter of general laws and logical principles. For positivists that was its appeal; for inter- 
pretivists, the grounds for rejecting its applicability to the human sciences. Similarly, for 
and interpretivists alike, history was historicist--hence beyond causal analysis. A 
historical epistemology implicitly knocks out the foundations of these very shared assump- 
tions: Neither science nor history fit the images depicted by either side of the debate. 
Science does not exist outside its own historical conditions; those historical conditions, 
however, are themselves theoretical causal sequences and relational structures. 
An historical epistemology thus invites us to think about history as a dimension of 
epistemology and thus a constituent, rather than an illustrative, element in the conditions 
for knowledge: "History, we too often say, is a purely descriptive discipline ...[ But] how 
could history of science fail to be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowl- 
edge may legitimately be asked to apply?" (Kuhn 1970:8,9). Like Stinchcombe (1978, 
1984) earlier, Tilly (1994) has recently taken up this invitation in his use of the 
"thick/thin" metaphor to characterize as "thin" the use of history as no more than a "trans- 
parent medium carrying along more substantial causes," whereas in "thick history time is 
"drenched with causes that inhere in sequence, accumulation, contingency, and proximity" 
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(p.270). Thick history is a causal participant in the construction of knowledge without 
which theory cannot explain the world. The implications of this expanded sense of history 
from thin to thick, from passive medium into the realm of epistemology, show not only 
that theories are inherently historical, but also that we call "history" is inherently theoreti- 
caL Indeed it is the "thin" use of history that has "repeatedly led social scientists to the 
mistaken conclusion that historians are particularizers while social scientists are gener- 
alizers" (Tilly 1994:270). Kuhn defrocked these caricatures and challenged us to develop 
epistemologies that no longer thrived on either one: Would we continue the work of 
liberating history from its "thin" status as "antitheoretical," "purely descriptive," and "par- 
ticularizing"? Or would we fall back on easy prejudices and "an entire arsenal of..[false] 
dichotomies" (Kuhn 1970:8)? 
HOW AND WHY K/H FAIL TO MEET KUHN'S CHALLENGE 
K/H have taken the latter route. In their attack on historical sociology they rely relent- 
lessly on the very caricatures Kuhn so forcefully challenged us to move beyond. Historical 
sociology is accused of 1) using naive inductivism rather than deductivism, and 2) doing 
"merely" descriptive narrative history rather than "general theory". At first glance, it ap- 
pears as if K/H are simply rehearsing an orthodox positivism, criticizing historical sociol- 
ogy for violating rules of logic and not producing adequately law-like generalizations. 
That they are, however, forcefully antipositivist in their commitment to rational choice's 
theory-driven logic of social analysis and causal mechanisms, makes it clear that K/H's 
position is more complex, and more challenging. To assess the justification for this 
epistemological mix, we need to place K/H's position in the context of scientific realism. 
TWO REALISMS OUT OF KUHN: THEORETICAL AND RELATIONAL 
One of the great paradoxes of the Kuhnian revolution is that it gave new life to an old 
idea. Scientific realism is the rationalist thesis that objects of knowledge exist and act in- 
dependently of our direct knowledge of them, even unobservable "theoretical entities" 
such as electrons and atoms, or social structures, classes, and market forces (Bhaskar 
1979,1986,1989; Hacking 1983; Putnam 1975). To understand why so much hangs on this 
claim, it is worth remembering that the issue of observability has been a thorn in the heart 
of science's basic aspirations ever since the 17th~. On the one hand, ever since Hume, 
science has insisted that for any knowledge claims to qualify as sound there must be 
sensory empirical proof; hence Comte's, Mill's, and Durkheim's insistence on a positive 
sociology. At the same time, however, even before Hume (e.g. Descartes) science has al- 
ways had the rationalist goal of understanding laws forces and structures that, even 
though beyond the senses, are nonetheless believed to be the red forces at work in the 
world--albeit a reality beneath "appearance."14 The tension, of course, is that the priorities 
of positive evidence, versus rationalist or realist understanding, are competing goals. Do 
Durkheim's "social facts" really exist, that is explain anything? We can observe the (ap- 
parent) results of racial discrimination, but how do we "prove" a causal claim about racial 
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characteristics? Are Marx's economic laws really true? We can count income distribution, 
for example, but how do we "prove" a causal claim about class exploitation? Are people 
"really" rational choosers? We can count low voter turnout, but how do we "prove" that 
the cause is really utility maximization and/or free ridership, as opposed, say, to produc- 
tion of registration difficulties put in the way of voting by state and county governments? 
Although they long vied for dominance,in the 20th century the victory had gone 
decisively to those who insisted that knowledge had to be justified by what was called 
"theory-independent observation languageu--theory must hold up against what in the last 
instance can be observed empirically, not what might (in theory) "really" be deeper, un- 
observable forces. Counterintuitively, this positivist position is anti-realist because it' does 
not define as "real" anything beyond the observable (correlated with indicators or acces- 
sible to inference and measurement). This is not to say that antirealists accept no such 
thing as "reality;" simply that what is inaccessible to us is--for all scientifc purposes--as 
good as "not-real," since we have no empirical support for believing in it. Realists call this 
"actualism" as it "denies the existence of underlying structures which determine ... events, 
and instead locates the succession of cause and effect at the level of events [empirical 
regularities]" (Collier 1994:7) 
At stake in the question of realism is thus.a great deal more than talk of metaphysics; 
these are questions of how do we buiM an explanation and what does it take to justify any 
given explanation based upon unseen causes. Questions about the reality of unobserv- 
ables matter because most social theories attribute causality to--that is, theorize about-- 
unobservable phenomena, such as explaining the fall of the Berlin Wall by reference to a 
democratic 'political culture.' If theories can only be justified empirically, what counts as 
a theory of democratization must be limited to inferences from statistical regularities 
about, say, opinion-polled discontent and degrees of capital infusion. To be sure, at- 
titudinal indicators and factor analysis can be used to translate unobservable theoretical 
entities into correlations; but correlations are not causes. So while we can count survey 
answers and numbers of firms, a force called "political culture" still remains inaccessible 
to the senses and so--for antirealists--cannot be attributed the status of a "real" cause. 
Antirealism thus puts strict limits to what we can justifiably claim to be able to explain 
on the basis of what we can know positively to be real. Realism, by contrast, adamantly re- 
jects these limits to what counts as theory, and is the inverse in every respect--beginning 
with its postulate that little about the social or natural world makes sense unless one 
believes in the reality of unobservable forces. From this premise follows the difference 
over what counts as theory: Whereas antirealists limit explanation to the covering law 
model and exclude causality, realists insist that explanation can and must be causal in the' 
sense of accounting for mechanisms, regardless of empirical access. Realism is clearly at- 
tractive because it allows us to extend the reach of "objective" theory beyond the limits set 
by positivism, and allows us to theorize about that which positivism excludes--the causal 
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power of unobservable mechanisms. 
By now it should be obvious just how sigmficant would have been the Kuhnian revolu- 
tion for realism. Kuhn's historical challenge to the absolute primacy of observation in ad- 
judicating scientific truth gave new life to the premise that there is more to "reality" than 
what is observable or easily translated into empirical indicators. In fact, Kuhn's 
demonstration that scientific theories are rarely disposed of due to lack of fit with data 
but because of the appearance on the scene of a more powerful (more problem- 
generating) competing theory-paradigm suggested that it is not only possible, but justified 
to claim that theories about reality (rather than observation) were actually the prime- 
movers of scientific knowledge. How else was it possible or justified for Newton to use the 
theory of gravity to explain a falling apple? At the end of the day, after all, despite all the 
strains and struggles to make the consequences or effects of an unobservable observable 
(preferably "calibratable"), "gravity" itself was and is unseen and thus remains a theoreti- 
cal entity. 
The monumental challenge that postKuhnian realism continues to face, however, is 
how to convince us why we should believe in this reality's--putative--existence. It is one 
thing to agree instinctively that there exist social and natural forces and dynamics beyond 
the access of empirical perception; it is wholly another thing to consider as more than 
prejudice any particular theory about the nature of those social "realities." Thus, for exam- 
ple, if faced with a theory that explains the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms of 
market forces, game theoretic agency, or political culture, the antirealist asks why should 
anyone believe these claims to be true when they attach causal power to phenomena that 
we cannot see, feel, hear, or touch? As long as we continue to believe in theories dealing 
in unobservable phenomena (as in most social science), it is fair to ask for an account of 
how we can know--reliably--of such causes (Hollis 1994: 12). 
It is on this issue of epistemic access that realism is radically divided; and I want to sug- 
gest this division can be interpreted as two contrasting routes out of Kuhn, each bearing 
differing traces of a contested Kuhnian legacy that has become part of our contemporary 
knowledge culture. On the one side runs theoretical realism. Following the theory-centric 
route, theoretical realism believes that theories s u ~ v e  to the extent that they are true 
pictures of what is real, and that this truth is guided by "general theory," channeled exclu- 
sively through deductive logic, but in the final instance confirmed by the same general 
theory--defined as a set of ontological axioms about the unobservable generative mechan- 
isms at work in the social world. Harking back to 17th-century Cartesian rationalism, 
building in part on Friedman's (1953) deductivist method of "positive economics,"15 and 
bolstered by theory-centric postKuhnianism, for theoretical realism theories are 
notoriously "under determined by data" (Newton-Smith 1978:72; Boyd 1973). Lakatos 
(1970), for example, perhaps the most influential representative of theoretical realism 
(and certainly the primary influence on K/H), represents himself as having improved on 
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Popper in light of (a theory-centric) Kuhn: Competing theories should be adjudicated not 
on the basis of which one displays consistency with evidence, but of which one outpaces 
the evidence: "the -- well planned--building of pigeon holes must proceed must faster than 
the recording of facts which are to be housed in them" (Lakatos I :  100). Lakatos describes 
the scientific project not as a paradigm but as a "research program" comprised of an ex- 
ogenous "hard core" not subject to debate, problematization, or disconfirmation that, in 
practice, takes on the status of a metaphysic or what K/H and many rational choice 
theorists call a "general theory." It is protected by an outer "auxiliary protective belt" 
which "receives" implications/predictions from the hard core, translates them into 
hypotheses, and allows only these to be tested, or open to new formulations and measure- 
ments. The inner hard core, by contrast, remains pristine and fully protected from threats 
of "naive falsification." Thus, as we will see, rational choice theorists protect their "gener- 
al theoretical" assumptions about individual utility maximization and intentionality-driven 
mechanisms within the hard core allowing only the implications for a specific case to be 
sent out into the potentially disconfirming world of testing. 
Against "empiricist epistemology," theoretical realism follows Lakatos and assigns 
priority t0.a philosophically-based framework of research from which explanation is logi- 
cally inferred. In marked contrast to Friedman's explicitly instrumental use of "as if' as- 
sumptions to generate testable hypotheses, theoretical realism generates hypotheses from 
"a prior argument about social reality [which] should operate ... as a framework for re- 
search and as a regulative principle akin to the principle of truth " (Lloyd 1986:9, emphasis 
added). And in contrast to the standard positivist criteria for "causality" (correlations of 
indicators in the form of manifest events) theoretical realism rejects "the necessity of reg- 
ular mechanical connection between events in favor of the idea of the essential causal 
powers of kinds of things" @. 8; emphasis added). For theoretical realism the work of 
,causal analysis is to "discover," at the most "general" level, the "structures, powers, 
propensities, and liabilities of both persons and social structures so that general law-like 
statements about both of them can be madeu--statements that refer to the "essential but 
unobservable powers and tendencies of natural kinds" rather than to event-event regu- 
larities (Lloyd 1986:156). This conception of general theory thus marks theoretical 
realism's departure from both positivism and the historical postKuhnians: "Theory" con- 
sists of identifying the essential and timeless properties of the social and natural world 
that will constitute its Lakatosian "hard core." 
Over the last decade, a relational and pragmatic realism has emerged as a postKuhnian 
philosophy of science that is squarely on the other side of the epistemological divide from 
theoretical realism.16 Relational realism is the thesis that belief in the causal power of an 
unobservables--such as states, markets, or social classes--does not depend on the 
rationality or truth of any given theory but upon practical evidence of its causal impact on 
the relationships in which it is embedded. Following the historical Kuhn, relational 
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realists believe that while it is justifiable to theorize about unobservables, any particular 
theory entailing theoretical phenomena is historically provisional. For relational realism 
that means one can believe in the reality of a phenomenon without necessarily believing 
in the absolute truth or "reality" of any single theory that claims to explain it. The belief in 
a phenomenon or an outcome instead depends on ekidence of its causal and relational 
significance in time and in space, a practice that often entails building models to represent 
theoretical entities and testing them by observing effects and inferring by "abduction" to 
the existence of the entities. But the practices need not be so formal: Why do relational 
realists continue to believe in electrons when theory X has been proved wrong? Because, 
regardless of the successive fate of competing theories of electrons, and long after 
whatever is the current theory has been surpassed, supermarket doors will still open auto- 
matically when we step on the rubber mat thanks to whatever reality the theoretical con- 
cepts of "electron," and "photon" now represent (Hacking 1990:356). Substitute the term 
society, domination, gender, or any variety of social concept, and the same argument 
holds. For example, a social science relational realist would argue that despite the fate or 
fashion of any particular theoretical term such as "sex roles," "sexual division of labor," or 
"gender,"--each of which represents a different causal conception of an unobservable 
postulated reality--we have reason to believe in the causal force of that which these terms 
variously attempt to sigmfy as long as when we dress a baby in blue, we can observe that 
people treat that baby differently than when we dress that same baby in pink. 
Relational realism is thus a "minimalist" realism (Humphreys 1988; Longino 1990) in 
that it presumes that if one is going to be a realist at all--that is, assign mind-independent 
identity to the world--then, by definition (and humility), one must be somewhat agnostic 
about the absolute truth of any given theory about the world. This is what Bhaskar (1986) 
means when he distinguishes between the "intransitive objects of science ... and the chang- 
ing (and theoretically-imbued) trmitive objects which are produced within science" as a 
practice" @. 52). Belief in an entity or a phenomenon may well outlast numerous conflict- 
ing and failed versions of a theory--to wit, the perdurability of the belief in "society" 
despite numerous failed versions of social theories. Where the two realisms differ, then, is 
that while theoretical realism attributes an ontological truth to the theoretical 
phenomenon (e.g. the theory of electrons, or of market forces), relational realism focuses 
on the relational effect of the phenomenon itself (e.g. the impact of the hypothesized 
electron on its environment, or of the hypothesized market forces on an observable out- 
come). 
Relational realism is pragmatic and relational because it believes phenomena to 
have causal properties only in virtue of relational evidence, and because such knowledge 
can only emerge through "the temporality of practice" (Pickering 1992a:2-3,9; see also 
Carnic and Xie 1994). It is the relational effect of an hypothesized phenomena such as 
gender, sex roles, etc. that makes us believe in it--regardless of what we call it--and not be- 
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cause of any single theory. To be sure, regardless of whether social or natural scientists, 
relational realists believe in the importance of determining which theories more closely 
represent reality. But the relational realist does not base her preferring one causal claim 
over another on whether or not she has found a theory lean and parsimonious enough 
from which she can derive it logically. Science has shown us that some theoretical reality- 
claims are false just because the entities in question are not really there -- whatever their 
logical validity, beauty or parsimony: Epicurean atomism is not true, there are no 
humours, nothing with negative weight exists, women's wombs do not wander; "phlogiston 
is one with the witches and the dragons" (MacIntyre 1980:72). But other causal claims 
have endured despite a succession of different theoretical positions to account for them. 
Social phenomena endure; but the "theoretical entities" that purport to explain them are 
socially constructed--some better than others, I should add, because more relational. 
What's wronp with theoretical realism? 
K/H are theoretical realists--and thus heirs of the unbalanced theory-centric reading of 
Kuhn. My criticism, however, centers not just on their theoretical realism, but on their pe- 
culiar mixture of pre-Kuhnian antirealism in their-dedication to the covering law model of 
universal regularities, with their postpositivist theory-centrism as expressed in their com- 
mitment to causal mechanisms. Each in itself is problematic but in combination they op- 
erate in such tension with each other that they generate incoherent grounds for critique. 
K/H: "WHAT ADEOUATE EXPLANATIONS MUST ENTAIL" 
K/H start out on a bad foot: "[Wlide agreement exists across social science" about the 
"first requirement of an adequate explanation--causality" (K/H 1991:4). Contra K/H, no 
such consensus exists. Contestation over causality has been the greatest thorn in 
epistemology ever since Hume convinced philosophers that the most we can call an expla- 
nation is a statement of correlations, and the most we can say about correlations is driven 
not by necessity (as with mechanisms) but by statistical probability--which does not claim 
to be a true account of the causal mechanisms that explain how a (hypothesized) cause ac- 
tually produced the observed effect. As any frustrated social scientist knows from the dif- 
ficulties of trying to prove causality despite overwhelmingly strong statistical correlation 
between, say, capital punishment and black defendantslwhite Gctirns, the battle to over- 
come the stigma of what positivist skeptics from Comte, to Mill, to Popper have called the 
mere "psychological appeal" of "ideas" about causation (beyond conjunction) has by no 
mean been won (Popper 1950:722; Comte 1830:14-16).~~ 
Underlying these questions of method, as I stressed above, is positivism's antirealist 
epistemology: What counts as an explanation is limited by what we can claim to know 
empirically to be real enough to refer to as a cause in the first place. Questions of explan- 
atory methodology are thus inexorably linked to deeply contested issues over realism, and 
to difficult questions about how to explain by reference to causal mechanisms whose 
"reality" is based on forces that can neither be observed, nor manifested beyond corre- 
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lated indicators, nor conjured up a priori. What "adequate explanation must entail" is thus 
hardly a matter of "consensus." 
Causal Relations and Causal Mechanisms 
Seemingly unaware of these ambushes, K/H plunge headfirst into this methodological 
thicket asserting flatly--and wrongly--the existence of similar agreement over the stricture 
of an adequate explanation, namely both causal relations and mechanisms (p.4). "Causal 
relations" refers here to the standard covering law model in which a true hypothesis must 
be analyzed logically in relationship to that which is to be explained as a generalization of 
constant conjunction: "In essence, causal explanation works by subsuming events under 
causal laws [Elster 1983:26Iu (K/H 1991:6). Then, with no attention to the fact that the 
covering law model flatly rejected explaining by causal mechanisms, they then go on to 
demand just that--"A complete explanation also must specify a mechanism that describes 
the process by which one variable influences the other ..." (p.5). Hence the first glaring in- 
coherence: K/H attempt to combine a covering law model logic based on empirical regu- 
larities with a method of imputed causal mechanisms--exactly that which covering law 
model theorists rejected as part of a legitimate explanation.18 
Here K/H stumble badly. Deep into the terrain of what their original authority (Hume) 
declared metaphysics and theology (realist views about causal mechanisms), K/H none- 
theless express a positivist concern: "like causality itself, mechanisms are not directly ob- 
servable ... How then are they to be imputed?" (p.5). They suddenly exit the world of 
realism and again climb giddily onto Hume's stolid anti-realist shoulders and announce 
they have solved the problem of the unobservability of mechanisms by invoking relations: 
"Whenever the source of some event is unobserved, we should proceed on the hypothesis 
that it fits a pattern of causal uniformity. Causal uniformity implies the existence of a 
lawlike relationship that holds between events" (p. 6). The incoherence thus deepens: As 
K/H themselves have argued (p.4-10, 15-17), hypothesizing event uniformity (as in the 
covering law model) is not the same thing as finding causal mechanisms; just as in the face 
of inadequate exogeneity demonstrating that childhood cancer is clustered in dense elec- 
trical power zones is not the same thing as demonstrating that (via direct causal se- 
quences) concentrated electrical power causes cancer. Indeed limiting i n  explanation to 
event uniformity was the positivist's way to remain on empirical foundations. 
But caught in the problem of trying to join the antirealism of covering law model 
(which rejects the viability of causal mechanisms) to the realism of rational choice. 
theory's need for mechanisms, K/H's only solution is to demand a strict inferential rela- 
tionship in which causal 'mechanisms are "subsumed" under the causal law (p. 6). Rather 
than solving the problem of how to find mechanisms, K/H appear to be simply waiving 
the problem away by retreating back into the safety of lawlike relations. Having first 
called them the "enduring focus of sociological explanations" [15]), they now want to con- 
flate mechanisms into the uniformity of invariant laws. Struck by the awkwardness of this 
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attempted merger of realism and antirealism, we might now ask: Whatever happened to 
the second requirement for adequate explanation--the mechanisms? 
Theoretical Realism: Overcomin~ the Limits of Observation 
Enter Theoretical Realism--the thesis that unobservable underlying realities can be as- 
certained by theoretical reason. Whereas the empirical requirements of positivism forced 
theorists from Hume to Popper to reject the search for deep causality beyond conjunction 
and probability, and whereas relational realists use relational effects to observe theoreti- 
cal entities, theoretical realism provides K/H a deus ex machina by making theory "see" 
what their senses cannot: "general theory [is the] basis for the imputation of causal me- 
chanisms ... mechanisms must be imputed from general theories" (K/H:5,15,16). Following 
the Lakatosian route out of Kuhn (through Popper) into the "hard core" of "general 
theory," theoretical realism thus allows K/H to accomplish by theoretical fiat that which 
has for centuries confounded philosophers--to bypass the epistemological problem of how 
to establish true causal explanation of mechanisms in the face of the problem of un- 
observability: "[Mlodels and mechanisms can only come from general theory" (p. 19). 
What--and Where--is General Theory? 
We have arrived with anticipation at "General Theoryv--the fount of K/H's "adequate 
explanation." But--search as we might, it turns out that K/H newer tell us what is general 
theory. To be sure, throughout they refer to it with a sprinkling of accolades designed to 
contrast with the weaknesses they impute to historical sociology--"theoretical boldness," 
"scope," "generality," "analytic power," and "parsimonious" (p.9,21). But the closest they 
ever come to a definition is to repeat that general theory is the "source" from which causal 
laws and mechanisms are to be derived. Indeed at p. 17 we are presented not with a gen- 
eral definition but with a single case of a general theory--rational choice theory--and then 
informed that, to date, it is the only such case (p.23). This presents a dilemma: The 
weaknesses, or for that matter the strengths, of rational choice--or any particular substan- 
tive general theory--is not the purported subject of K/H's argument; according to K/H, it 
is the formal criteria of methodology that are. Yet since discussion of these are missing at 
what turns out to be the crux of their entire argument, they have left us no choice but to 
use the particularities of rational choice to develop a "general" conception of general 
theory. We can thus add to K/H's difficulties that: 1) they have engaged a questionable 
maneouvre: Paying only the small price of an inconsistency in logic, they have smuggled in 
their preferred theory in the guise of general and neutral standards of epistemological 
adequacy; 2) they have thus violated the rules of epistemology and methodology which, by 
definition, reflect general criteria for sound knowledge and are not derived from any one 
substantive theory; 3) and with this rather imperial move of conflating the specifics of ra- 
tional choice with the definition of general theory across the board, they have closed off 
debate and preempted any possibility of methodological pluralism (Anderson 1993). 
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General Theorv: APents as Mechanisms 
With these obstacles in mind, I begin by surmising what general theory is not. It is not 
in itself (although it may be used to impute) a set of testable propositions, either general- 
ized from historical comparisons or deduced from empirical hypotheses. And it should not 
be (at the risk of tautology) either models or mechanisms, since K/H told us those derive 
from general theory. In fact, in keeping with the hybrid character of their overall ap- 
proach, K/H's general theory turns out to be a peculiar mix of aspirations--combining a 
methodological commitment to general laws (usually a staunchly empirical methodology) 
with a radically anti-empirical theoretical ontology: Rational choice's general theory is a 
definitional bundle of assumptions about the nature of reality; a body of axioms that 
postulate the essential causal properties and powers of the social world. These essential 
properties and powers are mental states embodied in the intentionality of the individual 
agent: "All rational choice explanations begin with the assumptions that individuals are 
purposive and intentional actors who pursue prespecified goals ...[ i]n rational choice 
theories, interests are specified a priori"(p.l9,21). Given metatheoretical form by 
Lakatos's (1971) influential theoretical realism, these assumptions are the "hard core" of 
the rational choice research program." 
This conception of general theory is a classic case of what is called an "ontic methodol- 
ogy" (Salmon 1984), and it is an approach at the axial core of all theoretical realism. The 
term is itself a hybrid: First it refers to an explicit ontology--a thesis about the nature of 
the social world. In keeping with theoretical realism's rejection of what one realist calls 
the "long-standing neo-positivist injunctions against metaphysical postulates in the expla- 
nation of social actions" (Carlnaes:248), the ontic approach explicitly opposes positivism's 
privileging of epistemology over ontology (in which the question of whether we can really 
claim to know something takes precedence over the attraction of a postulated theoretical 
entity). Instead, it begins with what positivism excludes: An empirically unknowable, and 
unfalsifiable, theory of reality as a causal structure--"a prior argument about social reality" 
based on "the idea of the essential causal powers of kinds of things" (Lloyd 1986:8). In 
keeping with its antipositivism, ontic approaches are inherently driven by theoretical 
realism's fundamental distinction between "appearance" and "reality"--a distinction as old 
as rationalism itself. "Appearance" are the mere "events" accessible to the senses of the of 
the observer; to mistake these for "reality" at the level of deep causal structure is to be 
empiricist. Precisely because so much of what we now know really makes the world tick is 
in fact not empirically manifest, the theoretical realist, by contrast, privileges as the real 
source of causality those deep "ontic" structures and mechanisms of reality that are not ac- 
cessible to the senses (Bhaskar 1978,1979,1986; Putnam 1997:181-84). 
That rational choice has a core ontology is not in itself surprising; the protestations 
of some social scientists notwithstanding, all theories of knowledge make a more or less 
explicit ontological choice between either the individual or the social structure as the 
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basic unit of social analysis (Alexander 1982). What makes K/H's approach different than 
a simple ontology is the combination of the ontology with the methodology--specifically, 
with the rational choice commitment to theorizing causal mechanisms. The result is not 
just a commitment to individualism, which could just as easily apply to interpretivist ap- 
proaches. It is a commitment to a causal ontology in which agential intentionality is 
posited--a priori--to be the fundamental causal force/mechanism at work in the social world 
(Elster 1983,chs.l-3,1986:12,16). An agent-centered ontology, to be sure, but more impor- 
tant is that as part of its very definition of reality it attributes exogenous causal power--via 
the property of mental intentionality--to its agential units of analysis. What completes the 
hybrid of an ontic methodology, then, is that a causal explanation (not just a postulated 
description) is already built into the definition of social reality. This is a theory--more pre- 
cisely, an ontic methodology--not just of agents as rational, but of agents as mechanisms. 
Since all explanatory requirements flow from this presuppositional causal ontology, 
it is not rationality per se that does the main explanatory work in rational choice's general 
theory; more important is the causal capacity attributed to the individual agents through 
the disposition of intentionality--which is said to be inherently causal. Such an inherently 
causal ontology that postulates its agential units to have a priori causal powers and forces 
makes use of what Hempel (1965472) called "broadly dispositional traitsu--a term that 
evokes the causal necessity characteristic of certain "dispositions." The dispositional traits 
of intentionality and purposiveness are the essential but unobservable powers and 
properties I have stressed to be at the core of theoretical realism. But what we have now 
learned is that they are also the very same mechanisms that K/H tell us are the central 
component of all adequate explanation, what philosophers call "reasons as causes" (Elster 
1986:12; see also Rosenberg 1988:27-30).19 Because they are dispositional, these mechan- 
isms cause action with law-like necessity: It would be no more possible (all things being 
equal) for the agents of rational choice theory not to be driven by their purposes than it 
would be possible for glass not to break on impact--given its essential dispositional trait as 
"brittle."20 
At the heart of this general theory, then, is a metaphysical vision of reality as an 
ontic structurecomprised of agential units with necessary causal powers. The explanatory 
work is carried out by the invariant causal mechanism of agential intentionality that 
necessarily causes interests to convert into strategic actions. K/H's general theory has 
emerged to be a hybrid straining to make the center hold: It is buiit on a law that aspires 
to the covering law model of universality (intentionality causes action); but it is a law in 
which the crucial explanatory causal mechanisms are given exogenously. This is why 
Rosenberg (1988: 23) calls this kind of law "folk psychology": Rather than discovered (or 
problematized), deduced, induced, or generalized the content of this law comes ready- 
made; causality is inscribed exogenously. Independent variables are usually hyothesized 
rather than postulated, but in this case intentionality as causality is not only defined in ad- 
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vance but defined as the a priori cause of all known effects. The causal mechanisms built 
into rational choice theory are always the same: Agents equipped with causal dispositions 
that, universally and necessarily, are charged with a momentum from cause/intentionality 
to effectlstrategic action. General theory, for K/H is a theory of agenrs as mechanisms 
believed to constitute and, by general universal law, to embody in their consciousness the 
essential causal powers and forces that drive the social world. 
From General Theorv back to Laws and Mechanisms 
We have now reached the apex of a journey in search of how to produce "an adequate 
explanation" (K/H 1991:4). It began with a call for laws (causal relations), claimed it 
necessary also to find deep causes (causal mechanisms), and, having faced the problem of 
the unobservability of mechanisms, retreated back to laws and from there elevated to 
"general theoryn--a ontology of agents as mechanisms. What now? As a set of "given" as- 
sumptions, general theory clearly is not accountable to the petty trials of empirical con- 
firmation or problematization; rather, now that we have found the "source" of the models 
and mechanisms in this general theory, we are about to start descending again: "Beginning 
with these basic assumptions, rational choice sociologists then apply one or more of the 
.. . . .. .. . causal mechanisms derived from available [rational choice] theories (e.g. repeated game 
. . 
theory, optimal location theory, agency the0 ry...) to the problem at hand-. " (p.19, empha- 
,.- sis added). This is remarkable: The very causal mechanisms required for an adequate ex- 
planation are to be imputed from a general theory comprised of assumptions about-- 
. . causal mechanisms. Since causal mechanisms are already inscribed--regardless of any 
specific case or outcome being explored, K/H predefine what should be an empirical 
-. . . question, namely, the question of causality in any given historical case. The tautology is in- 
exorable: At the level of micro-theory, for example, because their very essences are con- 
stituted by the causal trait of intentionality, it would be no more possible to explain the 
actions of individuals without reference to their essential intentional dispositions, than it 
would be possible to explain glass breaking without reference to its disposition of brittle- 
ness. And at the macro-theory level, it would be no more possible to explain social out- 
comes without reference to the agential property and disposition of intentionality than it 
would be to explain a broken glass bowl without reference to its constitutional brittleness. 
With causal mechanisms already inscribed in the theory from which they derive these very 
mechanisms, and relying on an ontic methodology, K/H give new life to Plato's lament 
about the search for hidden truth: "if we know what we are looking for, we have already 
found it; if we do not know, we cannot recognize it when we do" (Hollis and Smith 
1991:408). 
Having it Both Wavs 
K/H have taken us on a dizzying circular trip: They have told us that something called 
general theory can give us the law or essence of a phenomenon, and from this essence 
they are handily able to explain their outcome by imputing to it the properties dictated by 
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the theory that has named these properties as the essence of its existence in the first 
place.21 The tautology lies in the absence of an independent explanatory structure; the ex- 
planation is already inscribed in the a priori definition of the problem, which presents us 
at the end with "little more ... than the explication of a definition" (Tilly 1995a: 1595). Thus 
despite their commitment to laws, nothing could be more incompatible with either stan- 
dard positivist rules of deductive logic in which the logic of generalization is required to 
be tested, perhaps falsified, in an observation language. 
When it comes to what counts as an adequate explanation, then, K/H try to have it 
both ways, in more ways than one. First, by combining the covering law model with me- 
chanisms they aspire to the certainty of positivity with the elegance of theorizing deep 
causality. Then they try combining the whole mix with an axiomatic ontology. The prob- 
> 
lem is that the covering law model logic they rely on cannot be combined with theoretical 
realism's presumption that once a theory is determined to be true, the terms of the gener- 
al theory denote the entities which are causally responsible for what we observe. The in- 
compatibility derives from theoretical realism's realist definition of general theory .as es- 
sential general properties, propensities, and powers--mechanisms, in short. By claiming to 
be able "explain" by deriving law-like regularities/conjunctions from an axiomatic general 
theory, K/H are trying to combine positivism's antirealism with rational choice's ontic 
realism, and in turn to deduce "how" mechanisms from this definitional theory--in ad- 
vance, that is, of any empirical investigation, and not by engaging with the phenomenon it- 
se& With this deeply anti-Humean/antipositivist solution in theoretical realism, K/H 
ultimately define general theory not by the Humean criteria they originally promised, but 
rather in anti-Humean realist terms as essential general properties, propensities, and 
powers. There is no requirement that one must be Humean or positivist in social science 
methodologies; coherence, however, does require that since it is K/H's own choice to be- 
gin with Hume, and in turn to take on board the problematic of observability, they cannot 
claim to have found a coherent solution in what is a radically anti-Humean conclusion--a 
general theory comprised of merely favored axioms about the imputed nature of reality. 
CAUSALITY AND HISTORY 
It would be churlish not to note the advance in-K/H's desire for an adequate explana- 
tion to include mechanisms. In the covering law model, mechanisms were excluded not 
only because of problems of observability, but also because causal processes were seen to 
be too historical and particularistic, rather than logical and generalizable (Popper 1959; 
Salmon 1984; Bohman 1991; Miller 1987). Theoretical realism does not rest content with 
positivism's restrictive demands for observability as the criteria for true causality and in- 
sists, rightly, that "cause" cannot be ascertained by conjuncture alone; some understanding 
of "mechanisms" must be developed--how it is, for example, that the constant conjuncture 
of social revolutions on the one side and, on the other, a conjuncture of peasant rebellion 
and state breakdown, is actually a relationship of cause and effect. By insisting on me- 
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chanisms, it appears that K/H are recognizing the processual element of causality--thus 
hardly reason to worry about whether theoretical realism is compatible with classical posi- 
tivism. 
The victory, however, is F'yrrhic. Admitting to the same constraints as positivists in not 
being able to actually observe causal processes, theoretical realism "solves" the problem 
by "observing" through a set of theoretical assumptions the "properties and propensities" 
of unseen entities (e.g. the structure of human intentionality). Thus no sooner do K/H 
turn to causal mechanisms than they declare that mechanisms can only be deduced from 
prior "omnitemporal, universal" laws, and then that both laws and mechanisms must find 
their source in a general theory--whose analytic power lies precisely in its temporal ab- 
straction (K/H 1991:6-7). This allows theoretical realism to reconcile its trafficking in 
metaphysics with the positivist goal of generating law-like theory. The kinds of deduc- 
tions about mechanisms that theoretical realism generates, given the definition of general 
theory as assumptions about essential properties internal to a contained entity, are deduc- 
tions conforming to the same principles of omnitemporality, universality, and uniformity 
as those postulates of the general theory from whence they are derived. The result of this 
series of moves is an even stronger embrace than the original positivist one of the anti- 
theoretical caricature of history. 
For Kuhn, positivism wrongly neglected history; K/H take this temporal void to a 
level much higher than Kuhn ever envisioned. Whereas the standard covering law model 
conceptualizes time as a "general linear reality" (Abbott 1988), K/H aspire to what can be 
seen as a non-linear reality which does not so much linearize time as much as freeze it 
entirely. Theoretical realism, in fact, accomplishes a remarkable feat by solving the prob- 
lem of causality not in the direction of Tilly's notion of "thick" causal time but in the direc- 
tion of even greater invariance. Thus K/H "rule out historical narratives as a basis for the 
imputation of causal mechanisms," and instead demand "minimal temporality" in selecting 
causal mechanisms ( ~ . 6 , 7 ) . ~ ~  With this, theoretical realism in general and rational choice 
in particular have managed to resurrect what many had hoped would remain a long 
moribund false dichotomy between theory, science, and knowledge on the one side, and 
history, temporality, and narrative on the other. Surely it is ironic to find two historical 
sociologists telling us that the ideal explanatory structure is the one with the least 
temporality or "thinnest" conception of time--the very thing that has "repeatedly led social 
scientists to the mistaken conclusion that historians are particularizers while social 
scientists are generalizers" (Tilly 1994:270). 
K/H: HOW DO WE KNOW IF A THEORY IS TRUE? 
K/H define an adequate explanation as one based on causal laws and mechanisms, but 
there is something missing in this definition--namely a convincing reason for why we 
should believe any given explanation. Recognizing the problems of observability in their 
requirements, K/H instead derive them from general theory, an exogenous bundle of gen- 
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era1 assumptions about the equally unobservable properties, motivations, and causal 
powers of the social world--agents as mechanisms. Unobservable mechanisms with real 
causal powers, operating with natural necessity, however, require a fresh story about what 
the world is like and how we know. But there's no trace of such a story in K/H's argu- 
ment. Positivists have always told us not to trust any theoretical claims that did not ad- 
dress the problem of knowledge. Even if they were wrong in pointing to observation as 
the only foundation for claims to knowledge, they were nonetheless right to demand 
epistemological accountability. K/H's chain of inferences from general theory, to laws, to 
mechanisms may be logical, but in a postKuhnian universe, logic does not make it true. 
K/H still owe us an epistemology--a convincing account for why we should believe them. 
In the same vein as their approach to an adequate explanation, the epistemology K/H 
do offer is cobbled together from a hybrid mix of pre-Kuhnian anti-realist deductivism, 
and an antipositivist theoretical realism. The anti-realist elements they use are: A) a logic 
of justification limited to induction versus deduction; B) the uncritical acceptance of the 
superiority of Popper's version of deductivist logic. Their theory-centric realist elements 
are: C) the conflation of history, experiment, observation, and problem-driven research 
with empiricism; D) an epistemology that tells us it is theory that adjudicates truth. The 
elements do not cohere: One cannot be committed to B -- a standard positivist deductivist 
logic of confirmation, in which truth is confirmed through observation language, and also 
adhere to C -- a postpositivist theory-centered view of justification which builds on a 
theory-laden conception of data. Nor can A--a spectrum of justification limited to induc- 
tion or deduction, be coherently joined with D -- a theoretical realist epistemology in 
which truth is ultimately adjudicated by theoretical first principles. 
The Limits of Pre-Kuhnian Deductivism 
K/H lambaste what they allege to be the empiricist and inductivist practices of histori- 
cal sociolbgy @p. 5-9,12-17). The philosophy of science, they claim, ruled that inductivism 
is methodologically unacceptable (pp.12-15), leaving deductivist logic as the only valid 
means by which to generate and confirm theory. Even within its own terms, however, it is 
simply wrong. Deductivism does not hold this position of unequivocal triumph in the phi- 
losophy of science. To be sure, the theory-centric route out of Kuhn described above did, 
until very recently, dominate the history and philosophy of science and, superficially at 
least, seemed to converge with the primacy of deductivism (Hacking 1983: 149-166; Miller 
1987:453-461; Pickering 1992). But this has changed dramatically in recent years as 
revisionist demystifications of the text-book stories have converged with Kuhn's original 
criticism of both deduction and induction, undermining a disproportionately deductivist- 
driven view of scientific advance (e.g.,Carnic and Xie 1994). 
The critique of deductivism also entails epistemological doubts independent of such 
recent corrections in the historical record. For one, Popper's criterion of falsification 
relies on "under-specified criteria" of what counts as a decisive falsification criteria (Hull 
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1988; Bohman 1991; Hollis 1994; Miller 1987), just as it neglects the fact that theoretical 
hypotheses often make no claims about observation directly and thus cannot be tested ex- 
cept when supplemented with other hypotheses. This allows an escape clause for the 
hypothesis of choice by simply attaching blame for a recalcitrant observation to faulty 
measuring devices or to the faultiness of the supplemental hypothesis, leaving the favored 
one intact (Quine 1957; 1963,1969; Hollis 1994:79-80; Rosenberg 1988:47). It is over- 
whelmingly obvious in the social sciences, moreover, that the test of falsification--in which 
a single counter-observation to the results hypothesized serves to "falsify" the entire 
theory--is virtually never practiced (consider Marx's theory of class formation [Somers 
1996b1); and for good reasons, given that more than one theoretical construction can al- 
most always be placed on a body of evidence (Kuhn 1970:76). 
Perhaps less known, but equally important, is the degree to which well-established 
scientific theories can survive and thrive despite bearing the burden of rather mind- 
boggling implications--that matter is made of molecules, for example, combined with the 
best-established theories of force, until the last few decades entailed that no floor could 
hold a person's weight . Deductivism fails here because it contains no criteria for dis- 
tinguishing between respectable reasons for defending a theory against such anomalies, 
and dubious tactics such as dismissing counter-instances as taken from insufficiently 
similar conditional situations, without specification of what would count as sufficient 
similarity (Miller 1987:232). Deductivism thus provides no way to prevent dogma from 
thriving quite comfortably under the guise of science. 
The obverse side of the stubborn ability of most hypotheses to s u ~ v e  the test of fal- 
sification is the even more privileged--and problematic--status of "corroboration" ac- 
corded to those theories for which disconfirming data has not yet been found. The 
theoretical indeterminacy of data, however, immediately makes suspect the idea that 
there will 'ever be firm consensus on what data cowtts as disconfirming in the first place-- 
thus allowing too much scope for theories to claim the status of having been corroborated. 
Even more conducive to theoretical hubris, corroboration as merely the absence of 
counter-evidence would mean that the more truly abstract the theory--and thus not 
amenable to concrete observations--the more likely it was to be considered valid; that 
planets of stars other than the sun are Camembert moons, for example, can be considered 
corroborated since we have no way to subject this hypothesis to the test of any actual ob- 
servations. Through failure to falsify, then, "All emeralds are green" and "All emeralds are 
grue" have both been corroborated (Miller 1987:235-6), just as through failure to yet fal- 
sify, "all post-Soviet capitalist regimes lead to socialism" allows it to stand, technically, as 
corroborated. 
What these problems consistently point to is the difficulty of proving or disproving a 
theory on purely logical grounds--the essential core of the deductivist claim to scientific 
superiority. Yet this is precisely what K/H do. Skocpol(1994:323), for example, rightly 
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points out that K/H attack her work "not by dealing with any of its substantive ideas or 
findings, but by showing --in very general logical terms --that it does not live up what they 
claim, in the abstract, any 'adequate explanation must entail'." They likewise simply dis- 
miss on logical grounds a vast array of substantive findings in historical sociology--ranging 
from world economies to contentious movements--on the grounds that these findings have 
been produced through "empiricism" and "induction" (K/H 1991:). 
One (by now well-worn) such logical, not substantive, criticism attacks the ability of his- 
torical sociology to achieve case independence (K/H 1991:13). In addition to ignoring the 
enormous network theory literature that takes issue with these assumptions, this also 
presupposes the naive belief that cases are given in the nature of things rather than con- 
structed along analytic parameters on the basis of problem-driven research specified not 
by some essential identity of the case but by the problem the researcher has set out to ex- 
plain. Historical sociologists, by and large, draw the lines of independence between cases 
depending upon what it is they are trying to explain; case selection is an empirical histori- 
cal not a logical operation. What one wants to establish is that an object is an empirical 
causal unity for the purpose at hand.23 Thus Skocpol reminds us that she "could and did 
make comparisons" between cases she carved out as temporal "episodes" of sociopolitical 
conflict within single countries because her cases were not simply predefined as "coun- 
tries" (p. 322) but drawn up analytically precisely to be able to test the causal impact of 
Russia's state apparatus as it weakened over time between 1905 and 1917. Similarly, Put- 
narn (1993) and Somers (1993) draw theoretical conclusions by comparing contrasting 
political cultures across different regions of a single country--cases that would be ruled 
non-independent (because in the same national society) according to an abstract logic 
that leaves unproblematized the crucial question of "What is a Case?" (Ragin and Becker 
1992). In all of these examples, arguments from abstract logic overlook the valid findings 
that emerge when cases are configured according to "the logic of the causal hypotheses 
being presented and tested (Skocpol and Somers 1980:194), that is, according to what it 
is that is being problematized. Following Marc Bloch's (1934:81) maxim: "Only the unity 
of problem makes a center," independence is defined analytically along substantive not 
logical dimensions in full recognition that the construction of cases is problem-, not logic-, 
driven in those studies whose findings have held up best over time. 
Post~ositivist Deductivism 
K/H specify three criteria to adjudicate among competing theories: "plausibility, 
reduction of time lags between cause and effect, and the empirical implications" (K/H 
1991:6). Each of these criteria, including the third, is not either a logical or an empirical 
criterion but a substantive theoretical one--in this case rational choice theory. The test of 
a good theory for K/H, then, is whether it meets the criteria of the partic'ular theory 
favored by the researcher. This rather unworkable hybrid of antipositivist theoretical 
realist deductivism manifests itself in the circular reasoning K/H employ in their various 
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discussions of these criteria. First they present us with a criteria based on logic: 'The suc- 
cess of such studies ultimately rests on the degrees to which they meet the requirements 
of good causal explanations" (Hechter 1992:368). Then, in light of the sobering recogni- 
tion that one of their logical criteria--providing causal mechanisms--relies on "unobserv- 
able~" they turn to theoretical realism: "We cannot go out and collect the data [on causal 
' mechanisms] ... on the contrary, this is what we need general theories for" (Hechter 
1992:368). These assumptions generate logical inferences which tautologically confirm 
their hypothesized ontology of the world. Theory, in other words, provides the data by 
which that same theory is to be judged. 
Consider again their criterion for theoretical success being the "greatest reduction of 
time lags between cause and effect." Citing Elster [1983, p.241 K/H state that the best 
way to reduce the time-lag between cause and effect is to replace macro-variables by 
micro-variables or to link macro-level variables using intervening micro-level ones (p. 7). 
But micro-foundations in the way they use them are not logical criteria; they are the cen- 
tral metatheoretical principles of rational choice (see e.g. Elster 1989). Hence the prob- 
lems with historical sociology that K/H refer to (p.16)--historical sociology's "inadequate 
micro-foundations"--turn out to be not logical ones at all, let alone empirical ones, but dis- 
agreements among rival theoretical views of the world.24 K/H are telling us, unabashedly, 
that the presence of microfoundations must be the general epistemological criterion for 
the success of a theory. In this instance, mine is not a complaint against rational choice; it 
is an complaint against an epistemology that adjudicates the success of any given theory 
by axioms derived from the very essence of that theory. 
With their third criteria of testability, K/H now appear to follow Friedman's (1953) con- 
ception of "positive economics" and claim that these axiomatic assumptions are just that-- 
axiomatic "as if' heuristics, not meant to be realistic but designed to meet the instrumen- 
tal test of producing testable predictions (see also Bell 1980). From this perspective it 
matters not that hypotheses are inspired by unrealistic assumptions as long as they are 
kept logically distinct from the methods of justification by which the hypothesized predic- 
tions are to be tested--thus falling back on Popper's distinction between discovery and 
justification. But K/H are also post-positivist theoretical realists, for whom this distinction 
cannot no longer hold once it is recognized that in deciding on which facts to select and 
transform into evidence, we are already to a large degree deciding between rival theories 
(Hollis 1994:79). Moreover, as theoretical realists they believe that general theory is a 
great deal more than heuristics; it is more significantly the source of the causal mechan- 
isms they will use to "describe" and explain the world. To concede their general theory as 
no more than heuristic or instrumental (in the Friedmanite sense) would be to concede to 
positivism's anti-realist rejection of true causal knowledge about the deep structures of 
reality. With this concession would collapse the entire rational choice project. 
Thus vindicating the unrealistic character of their assumptions on the instrumental 
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grounds of their utility in generating predictions cannot coexist fit with the simultaneous 
demands either for a theory structured by general laws, or for a (true) theory of causal 
mechanisms. Referring to the first incompatibility, Green and Shapiro (1994) point out 
that "either the development of general theory is justified on covering-law grounds (in 
which case it cannot legitimately be based on unrealistic assumptions), or the unrealism is 
justified on instrumental grounds (in which case the particular mode of theory building is 
beside the point; testable predictions are what matter)" (p. 31, emphasis added). And as 
for the second, one cannot claim that theory is both the grounds for establishing reality on 
the one hand and, on the other, a mere analytic language of heuristics for which the 
criteria of realism is unnecessary to meet its prediction-generating goals. In fact as Fried- 
man would be the first to concede, causal mechanisms cannot be deduced from "as if' ex- 
planations which instead lend themselves to predicting empirical regularities, not causal 
accounts of "reality" (Friedman 1953). 
Even K/H's criteria of testing via "empirical implications" turns out to be a theoretical, 
not an empirical test, since it means being able to demonstrate the power to predict some- 
thing the theory already believes in--e.g. free rider problem (K/H: 8-10). It is not enough 
to claim, moreover, that their predictions work "retroductively" (Fiorina and Schepsle 
1982:63), as rational choice often does. For one reason, I have emphasized that it is al- 
most always the case in the social sciences that several theories predict consistently with 
the facts. For another, the kind of consistency being claimed here is not one in which an 
empirical puzzle--e.g. the occurrence of similar revolutionary outcomes in such vastly dif- 
ferent times and places as the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions--is suddenly ex- 
plained by a theoretical model or hypotheses that fits consistently not only with each set 
of drastically different empirical data from these three cases, but also with other negative 
cases of the same phenomenon (e.g. Skocpol 1979, 1984). Rather, the kind of "prediction" 
and "testing" that K/H use to exemplify the superiority of rational choice's theory-driven 
approach over the problem-driven one of historical sociology, is a post hoc one in which 
facts that are already known are "explained" in a post hoc account fashioned to be con- 
sistent with the originally posited cluster of rational choice assumptions about essential 
and ultimately untestable faculties and properties of the theoretical world. Such post hoc 
explanations of already given phenomena consistent with the original hypothetical as- 
sumptions amounts to little more than the ability to rewrite in a "tribal language" (Skocpol 
1994:325) what others have laboriously discovered. Moreover, given the "lack of 
specificity about what it means to be a rational actor, it is not obvious what sorts of behav- 
iors, in principle, could fail to be explained by some variant of rational choice theory" 
(Green and Shapiro 1994:34). Telling a rational choice story about data that's already 
been observed hardly qualifies as passing the "testability" that K/H repeatedly demand of 
adequate theorizing. "Data that inspire a theory" we are reminded by Green and Shapiro 
(1994), "cannot ...p roperly be used to test it, particularly when many post hoc accounts fur- 
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nish the same prediction. Unless a given retroductive accounts is used to generate 
hypotheses that survive when tested against other phenomena, little of empirical sig- 
nificance has been established" (pp.35-36). 
Finally, K/H use yet another set of time-worn criteria for good theory--"parsimony," 
"universality," "scope," "boldness," etc. But these fare no better than their testability claims. 
Why, after all, should we prefer these aesthetic qualities to, say, the "complexity, ex- 
pansiveness, and historicity" advocated by Dessler (1989:446),* or the now classic state- 
ment of Hirschman's (1984) "Against Parsimony"? The only convincing reason, as Hollis 
(1994) reminds us in referring to Friedman's (1953) similar demand for parsimony, is that 
they believe these qualities actually capture the reality of the world being theorized--that 
is, the world really is parsimonious and invariant. One could take issue with this ontology, 
as indeed I do in the next section; but one can neither confim2 nor deny it. That makes it a 
justification wholly at odds with K/H's original premise that the ultimate test of a theory 
is its testability. 
To sum up this section: K/H's assumption that the only available alternatives in 
theory construction are the inductive/deductive dichotomy at first glance appears to make 
them merely strong positivists on the deductivist side of the debate. But standard deduc- 
tivist logic confirms/tests a theory by observing the world -- so much so that, as I have em- 
phasized, it dismisses the possibility of using the unobservable world in theoretical ac- 
counts. K/H's version of deductivism, by contrast, is the aggressively antipositivist deduc- 
tivism of theoretical realism. But as theoretical realism believes in unseen entities on the 
grounds of theoretical logic it does not fit Popper's requirements for theory-testing by 
data ("conjectures and refutations"); it is a deductivism in which hypotheses are not only 
"guided (as discussed above) but adjudicated on the basis of general theory. Thus K/H's 
problems widen when they splice their post-positivist theory-centrism together with the 
positivist language of deduction. A postKuhnian theoretical realism combined with a pre- 
Kuhnian deductivism thus creates a hybrid suspended between what K/H call 
"empiricism," and a "theoreticism" removed from the need to observe the world. 
We have now come full circle. General theory is both the judge and the jury in an 
epistemology that, to paraphrase Hollis's (1994:36) remarks on rationalism more gener- 
ally, makes the purpose of a theory (of action, for example) to find the essence of any 
given phenomenon (a given action) by defining that concept (of action) in a way that (in- 
evitably) captures that essence. Hence K/H's .dismissal of the concern for accuracy and 
empirical detail, and their penchant for dismissing as "naive empiricism" any alternatives 
to their disproportionately deductivist view of theory. Here is an epistemology truly 
grounded in the assumption that the test of a good theory is its ability to trump 
observation on terms set by the same theory: To "outpace" the data that is to be placed in 
its pigeon holes (e.g. Lakatos 1971). The problem remains: We still have been given no 
good reasons to believe it. 
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THEORETICAL REALISM: AN ONTOLOGY FOR THE ANGELS 
In his recent discussion of how "to explain political processes," Tilly (1995a) criticizes 
sociologists' widespread use of "invariant models concerning self-motivating social 
units"(p.1596). His criticism is important and unusual; in lieu of the traditional exclusion 
of ontology from discussions of social science methodology, Tilly is insisting that because 
there is, willy-nilly, an inevitable influence of ontological assumptions--"the nature of that 
which is to be knownw--on epistemology--"the conditions for the generation of knowledge," 
it is important, above all, that those assumptions be "plausible" (Tilly 1995a: 1602) .~~  In 
keeping with this approach, let us examine first how K/H relate their epistemology to 
their ontology, and in turn take seriously K/H's own suggestion (1991:6) to consider the 
"plausibility" of the ontology they do embrace. 
In the first instance, rather than making their form of explanation dependent upon 
the character of the entities whose existence they are prepared to defend, K/H derive 
their ontology from their prior claims about what logical forms of explanation are accept- 
able. This strictly positivist approach reflects a 3-tiered method that exhibits the following 
logic: 1) ontological claims ("x exists," "x has these properties") are licensed only once they 
have been validated by a general theory of x; 2) we can capture the true intrinsic charac- 
ter of x (i.e., the properties, including causal powers, that x possesses) only through causal 
relations that relate x's to y's to z's according to the covering law model; 3) because we al- 
ready know x's ontological properties through the laws applicable to any given x, we need 
not bother ourselves with examining how x might be influenced by causal mechanisms 
through which x's are related to y's. Such mechanisms are held to be derivative from and 
entailed by x's causal laws. 
At the same time, however, and completely at odds with the above, K/H tell us that 
their laws are necessarily imputed from general theory. Because, as I stressed earlier, 
their general theory turns out to be an exogenous ontology of the causal structure of 
reality, in this second instance they are donning their antipositivist theoretical realist hats 
and rejecting the priority of logic by putting their ontology first. If, as Tilly suggests, this 
influence of a prior ontology on one's epistemology is to some degree inevitable, then in- 
deed we must ask, following both Tilly and K/H: How "plausible" is it? 
The basic ontological assumptions of rational choice are well known--that all actors 
apply the standards of means-ends rationality, that they are self-interested, and they are 
wealth maximizers. These assumptions have been challenged forcefully at every turn and 
from every conceivable angle, and it is not my purpose to repeat those challenges? Here, 
my focus returns to the implications of K/H's ontic methodology. Recall the basic agen- 
tial units of analysis in rational choice: Not just agents, qua individuals, but agents that 
come already equipped with the essential properties of purposiveness and intentionality 
that will by necessity cause them to "pursue prespecified goals" (K/H 1991:19). What 
emerges, then, is that the basic agential units actually are in themselves causal forces--what 
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Tilly (1995a: 1595) calls "self-propelling" entities. The theory that posits its causal me- 
chanisms to be exogenously borne by human agents, is also necessarily an ontology that 
assumes its agents to be inherently and exogenously self-galvanized by self-contained 
autonomous mental states (reasons)--thus making them "coherent, durable, self- 
propelling social units--monadsw (Tilly 1995a: 1602). 
But it was no less that Karl Popper ([I9341 1959) who famously took issue 
with what he called "essentialism"-a philosophy which looks to the "essence" of things for 
information about their "true" nature and behavior. An essentialist approach treats its 
subjects of analysis as constituted by a set of inherent attributes posited under its rubric-- 
attributes intended to represent its essence; hence for K/H and rational choice, the ex- 
ogenous causal power of intentionality. Essentialist ontologies, in this sense, are pre- 
social, almost Hobbesian (Pizzorno 1990). They posit not only fixed solipsistic identities 
but identities that come equipped to act through the mechanisms of their own 
autonomous momentum. Questions we would want to ask about this ontology include: 
How we can know the "essence" of an unobservable mental state in the first place? Can 
the single property of intentionality define a human being, let alone explain or predict hu- 
man action? How is it possible to claim social agency for an identity if its motivating force 
derives from "essential" pre-social or fixed categories constructed from exogenous at- 
tributes . (Somers . and Gibson 1994:55)? And is it not possible that these "essential" 
identities are "by-products of previous history adapted to current circumstance ... not 
causes, but rather ... spun after the fact as part of accounting for what has already hap- 
pened (White 1992:8)? 
Because theirs is an ontology that comes already inscribed with predetermined causal 
mechanisms, I find implausible K/H's perception of the social world--namely, that it real- 
ly is comprised of agents with essential and unchanging properties that operate indepen- 
dently of the very relationships by which they are constituted. And I also find implausible 
their world of invariance, a "world in which whole structures and sequences repeat them- 
selves time after time in essentially the same form" (Tilly 1995a:1602). K/H7s ontology of 
agents-as-mechanisms invokes a world populated by "angelsu--ontological entities which, 
implicitly, are not of this social world. They possess coherent attributes and essential 
properties whose actions are known in advance and measurable in autonomous, abstract, 
units. No wonder K/H are so confident of their predictive capacity: A world of angels 
possesses few surprises, founded as it is on invariant properties and attributes knowable a 
priori as the causal mechanisms that inexorably do their work in isolation from other 
entities or p roces~es .~  To be sure, as Tilly (1995a) ponders "if the social world actually 
fell into neatly recurrent structures and processes ... invariant models, and deductive 
hypothesis-testing would become more parsimonious and effective means of generating 
knowledge"@. 1602). The problem, however, is that while this "would be a convenient 
world for theoris &...it does not exist" (ibid:1596). 
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Rational choice theorists seem to disagree. As theoretical realists they presume the 
possibility of "real and relatively atemporal" objects of analysis that lend themselves to 
"objective and progressively successful discoveries and explanations of them" (Lloyd 
1986;9). For theoretical realists this conception of the categorically inherent properties of 
reality is the final adjudicator of reason. These assumptions generate logical inferences 
that tautologically confirm their hypothesized ontology of the world--its universal, om- 
nitemporal nature. This suggests that, in the final analysis, K/H's theoretical realist ontol- 
ogy is at root a metaphysics--an a priori belief that the social world really can be theorized 
as comprised of universal, invariant, entities with essential and unchanging properties. 
The irony is that as realists, K/H do believe that a "real" material world exists "out there." 
Yet, when the relational, and contingent element of time and being is removed, it be- 
comes a world of pure idealized spirit (Stinchcombe 1978:21). At the end of the day, one 
can only agree that K/H's rational choice vision rests on "an underlying ontology of 
'spirits' ... upon angels, that is, upon spirits both disembodied and independent ...[ the] goals 
or preference orderings ... essential to ... rational choice, are appropriate and relevant only 
to entities which are inertial as well as isolate--angels, in short" (White 1992:301). A 
world of angels may be parsimonious and "convenient" to theorize, but as Tilly suggests 
above, it is hardly real. 
RELATIONAL REALISM 
Relational and pragmatic realism is a postKuhnian perspective for the rest of us--those 
who are not angels. As minimalist (Longino 1990; Humphreys 1988), relational realism 
has three limiting principles: First, belief in the causal power of a theoretical social 
dynamic (e.g.,gender, utility maximization, class struggle), must be independent from ab- 
solute belief in any one particular theory. Following Kuhn's (1970: 173-74) mandate to 
think of theory advance as movement from present knowledge, rather than toward ab- 
solute truth, this injunction endorses Taylor's notion of "epistemic gain" in which knowl- 
edge is understood to be limited to "movement from a problematic position to a more 
adequate one within a field of available alternatives" (Calhoun 199536; Taylor 1989). 
Second, for all theory, especially one like rational choice that is premised on an a priori 
causal ontology, one is owed an epistemology--some very good reasons--for why we should 
believe it. And third, there are no universally valid principles of logical reasoning; there 
are only problem-driven ones (Kuhn 1970; Hesse 1980; Lloyd 1993; Miller 1987:486). 
Since space prohibits me from detailing the complexities of relational realism, I merely 
sketch out and signal the markers of this route that has begun to bear out the potential 
challenge of a historical epistemology. 
A Relational Realist Ontology 
A relational realist ontology is for those of use who accept, however unwillingly, the 
brutal fact that we and our social world are not angels, existing outside time and space, 
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but living, breathing, changing, dying creatures and entities, embedded in time and con- 
stituted through changing relationships. Beginning with the postulate that we are neither 
monads nor self-propelling entities but "contingent, transitory connections among socially 
constructed identities" (Tilly 1995a: 1595), a relational realist ontology takes the basic 
units of social analysis to be neither individual entities (agent, actor, person, firm) nor 
structural wholes (society, order, social structure) but the unit process of interaction be- 
tween and among identities (Collins 1981; Pizzorno 1986,1991,1995; Stinchcombe 1991, 
1992,1993,1995; Tilly 1995a,b,c). Insofar as professional historians have developed ways to 
represent these processual and relational characteristics of "the nature of that to be 
known," relational realists borrow freely from what has traditionally been historians' 
terrain--through the appropriation of narratives, for example, as a way to represent se- 
quences and processes over time (Abbott 1992,1993,1995; Aminzade 1992,1993; Griffin 
1993; Somers 1992,1994,1996). They do not do this because they want to be "particu- 
larizers"; if they choose narrative forms it is because they already believe that the world is 
made up of things that are constituted through temporal and spatial relationships and 
thus must be represented in those terrns (Wallerstein 1991). ~ e n c e ,  for example, agency 
can be usefully represented through the concept of a narrative identity to signify it as "pro- 
cessual and relational ...[ it] embeds identities in time and spatial relationships," and ana- 
lyzes all identities "in the context of relational matrices because they do not 'exist' outside 
of those matrices" (Somers and Gibson 1994:61,65). 
A relational ontology thus follows Popper's rejection of "essentialism" and instead 
looks at the basic units of the social world as relational identities embedded in relational 
configurations. In place of a language of essences and inherent properties, a relational 
realism substitutes a language of networks and relationships. Relational subjects are not 
related to each other in the weak sense of being only empirically contiguous; they are 
ontologically related such that identity can only be deciphered by virtue of its "place" in 
relationship to other identities in its web (Polanyi 1957b; Block and Somers 1984; White 
1992; Somers 1993). What appear to be autonomous categories defined by their attributes 
are thus better reconceived as historically shifting sets of relationships contingently stabi- 
lized in sites. Hence Cassirer (1953): Things "are not assumed as independent existences 
present anterior to any relations, but ...g ain their whole being ... first in and with the rela- 
tions which are predicated of them. Such 'things' are terms of relations, and as such. can 
never be 'given' in isolation ..."(p. 36, cited in Emirbayer 1996:s). 
One need not be a historical sociologist to embrace such a relational ontology; it 
entails no more than the premise that identities, and hence potential mechanisms, are 
constituted--not merely constrained--in variable relationships. Following Adams 
(forthcoming), it does not require a rejection of rationality but simply treating the "dis- 
position to act rationally as a variable rather than a postulate" (p.26); and, as per Smelser 
(1992), to conduct research into "the question of the contextual conditions--motivational, 
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information, and institutional--under which maximization and rational calculation 
manifest themselves in 'pure' form, under which they assume different forms, and under 
which they break down" (p.404). And what is true of rationality is of course equally true of 
relationality: "..relationships may be more or less bonded, the experience of them may be 
more or less constricting or enabling ... but this is a question of contingency ...[ for] rela- 
tionality is an analytic variable instead of an ideal type" (Somers and Gibson 
1994:61,65)?~ 
Relational Realism and "Adeauate" Explanation 
What counts as adequate explanation for relational realism can be distinguished in 
several ways from theoretical realism in its convergence with elements of a postKuhnian 
historical epistemology. First, the basic mechanism of causality is not within the single 
agent, but in the pathways of agential interaction or what Stinchcombe (1991,1992,1993,- 
1995) calls and demonstrates to be contingent and empirically variable "situational me- 
chanisms." Thus relational realism takes on board rational choice's criticism of 
functionalism's neglect of mechanisms without reverting to what I have been calling 
"agents as mechanisms." If the basic causal mechanism is the contingent relational path- 
way, rather than the mind of the self-propelling agent, it is not surprising that the social 
sciences are increasingly recognizing the necessity of explaining outcomes through what is 
most commonly known as path-dependency and sequence analysis (Abbott 
1983,1984,1992,1995; Aminzade 1992; Arthur 1989; David 1985; Aminzade 1992; Tilly 
1995% 1995b; Putnam 1993; Sewell 1996; Stark 1992; Steinrnetz 1994)' but also can be 
theorized as causal narrativity (Somers 1994b, 1996a). Adumbrated in Kuhn, and bril- 
liantly demonstrated in David's (1985) renowned economic analysis of the QWERTY 
keyboard, path dependence is a theory of causality that incorporates the sense of causal 
time in which "for any given trajectory, past choices and temporally remote events can 
help to explain subsequent paths of development and contemporary outcomes" (Amin- 
zade 1992:462; see also Skocpol1979). Path-dependence--especially when done through 
comparative trajectories (as is ideal)--allows us to hypothesize, theorize, and test the 
causal status of previously embedded institutional practices; 14th-century legal institu- 
tions, for example, can be shown under certain initial and subsequent conditions to not 
simply disappear or become "lag effects" with the onset of capitalist markets in the 18th 
century, but to become causal factors in the development of 19th-century democratic in- 
stitutions (Somers 1994b; see also Putnam 1993). Path-dependence suggests that earlier 
institutional processes are thus "sedimented" into the core of some of our most modern 
phenomena; they thus help to explain why certain of those phenomena, and not others, 
became possible in the first place. One of the most significant contributions of path- 
dependency or causal narrativity is therefore that it makes it pos'sible to theorize not just 
social change (long the sociologist's fixation), but the equally important--and neglected-- 
phenomenon of social durability or institutional patterns of (seemingly inefficient) 
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resistance (e.g. the QWERTY keyboard, or the English common law). These kinds of 
findings and theorizations would not be possible using, say, a traditional variables ap- 
proach in which each historical epoch is defined as a different case (Abbott 1992a). And 
although no one has done more than Abbott to demonstrate how an explanation that 
depicts mechanisms is best constructed through narrative sequential structures, it is telling 
that it was Mann (1986), Skocpol(1979;1993), Stinchcombe (1978), and Tilly 
(1984;1990)--four of K/H's core targets--who were amongthe earliest to demonstrate 
empirically and historically that outcomes could only be fully accounted for through 
causal explanations that incorporated degrees of path-dependency. 
The second aspect of a relational realist explanation decouples the two aspects of cause 
that form the centerpiece of K/Hps argument--laws and mechanisms. "How" questions 
(processes/mechanisms) cannot be deduced either from invariant laws (constant conjunc- 
tions/relations) or from the exogenous essential causal and powers that com- 
prise K/H's notion of general theory.30 The uncoupling of mechanisms from laws is 
justified by a) the contingent and indeterminate nature of the basic causal mechanism 
(the relational unit of interaction); and b) the fact that the adequacy of an explanatory 
structure depends upon why a question is asked: Different sorts of aims yield different ex- 
planatory demands. Thus laws are feasible to use for prediction, but only causal mechan- 
isms accounting for variation and relational linkages can explain how and why something 
actually happened. Neither fundamental laws nor imputed properties/dispositions govern 
objects in time and space; they only govern objects in abstraction (Cartwright 1983). The 
answer to a "how" question, rather, demands explanatory and empirically contingent 
causal pathways. This is evident in the respective rules for the two types of accounts. 
Competing theoretical treatments--treatments which offer different general laws for the 
same phenomena--are encouraged in physics. By contrast, only a single causal story is al- 
lowed. Causal stories do not tell first one causal story then another according to their 
convenience. Alternative causal stories compete in physics in a way in which covering law 
treatments do not. Causal stories are treated as if they are true or false, but which funda- 
mental theories "govern" the phenomena is a matter of convenience (e.g. there are dozens 
of fundamental theorems for laser operations and scientists openly choose one or another 
depending on other factors, ~ a r t w r i ~ h t  1984 pp. 11-12). And not surprisingly, although 
philosophers generally believe in laws and deny causes, because of the specificity of causal 
stories actual practice in physics works in just the reverse. 
Let's take a classic example from economic theory. The fundamental law is based on 
microeconomic theory and it purports to explain how firms make decisions about prices: 
Because they are motivated to maximize profits, managers determine prices by setting 
output at level where marginal costs and marginal revenues are equal. This may work as a 
powerful predictor about a relationship between managers and prices but it certainly 
doesn't give us an explanation for how prices are set. Why not? Because its an un- 
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'disputed fact in economics that no manager or any economist has the slightest idea of 
what the marginal cost of producing something is. For a cause to explain, the cause really 
has to exist; it has to be identified and exhibited. An "as if' underlying theory is not a 
cause, it exhibits no evidence. No less than Milton Friedman has admitted that the actual 
throught processes of managers cannot in practice resemble this model. We have a cover- 
ing law but we don't have an explanation. 
Since causality, unlike generality, involves "stories", it is also the historicity of the 
causal explanation that is equally relevant for the defense of history against the attacks of 
the general theorists. Take an example with which we are all familiar: It is a general 
covering law that to lose weight, you have to eat less. Thissuggests causal mechanisms-- 
eating less causes the effect of losing weight--and it may also be a powerful predictor, but 
it doesn't in fact ex~lain the mechanism of how that actually happens. The statement 
doesn't exhibit a cause. How do we exhibit a cause? We tell a story, a narrative about 
how a class of events is actually affected by something else. Since food has calories, and 
calories are energy, when we reduce our intake then the body has less energy to draw 
from external sources so it has to turn to internal sources of energy, which are stores of fat 
and it uses up fat when it draws that energy, etc. etc. Along the way we may use general 
laws but they aren't in themselves explanations for why, when we eat less, we lose weight. 
The moral of this story is that in science as well as sociology, an explanation which actual- 
ly depicts causal mechanisms is always told in narrative form. It is a set of sentences with 
transitive verbs. "The reduction of energy caused the body to draw on other sources ..." "A 
actually caused B to happen by means of the following mechanisms and processes ..." 
Cause implies narrative. The historical and temporal dimension of comparative history is 
thus as important as its comparative component for it entails explantory narrative. It is 
narrative because the explantion is embedded in time, and moves through time. Indeed 
the success of any explanation resides in its accounting for temporality and sequence. 
A relational realist explanation thus entails no trade-off between the false 
dichotomy of theory versus history. Following Kuhn's mandate to liberate history from its 
position of dismissive condescension, relational realism is devoted fully to the theoretical 
enterprise of causal explanation but from an ontology based on relational mechanisms. At 
issue in proposing a causal theory based on path dependency is not (as K/H insist) the 
choice to eschew generality in favor of particularism; rather it is the choice to find a 
causal approach to history that builds on the element of temporal process that is at the 
heart of any notion of a causal mechanism (e.g. Coleman 1986,1990). By example, rela- 
tional realism shows us that when we detach causal explanation from its "subsumed place 
as a predicate to a covering predictive law, we are not left with a naive particularism, as 
K/H suggest, but with Tilly's (1994) notion of time as one "drenched with causes that in- 
here in sequence, accumulation, contingency, and proximity (italics added, p.270). Path 
dependence as a form of causality thus converges with recent work in biology that sug- 
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gests that many of our natural laws may hold because they explain things that share a com- 
mon history (Hull 1977, 1978, 1981). 
Comparing historical sociology to evolutionary biology more generally clarifies the 
relational realism explanatory model, as everything that K/H have said against the former 
would apply equally to the latter (Gould 1981, 1988, 1989; Hull 1988; Kauffman 1993). 
Evolutionary biology is narrative, historical, and lacks true invariant laws, yet is now un- 
derstood to form the foundation of biology, along with genetic theory. It is, however, full 
of causal mechanisms and generalizing theory that explain how things happened 
(Kauffman 1993). There are no laws for the extinction of species, for example, but there 
are indeed mechanisms: a comet hits ... kills the dinosaurs thousands of years later. It was 
not, moreover, any intrinsic or essential properties of the poor dinosaurs that made them 
extinct, nor anything intrinsic to comets that they extinguish dinosaurs; it was just the bad 
luck of the dinosaurs to have been at the wrong place, at the wrong time. Yet the absence 
of law or exogenous properties does not prevent us from recovering causal generalization 
through historical comparison -- or what Gould (1989) calls "replaying the tape." Gould 
still requires that we test for causal attribution. He employs a kind of comparative 
causality that he calls "consilience" -- in which many independent sources "conspire" to in- 
dicate a particular historical pattern. The comparative test is crucial: If any of these ear- 
lier stages had not occurred, or had developed differently, then Y either would not have 
happened at all, or would have happened so differently that it would require a different 
explanation (see also Miller 1987; Tilly 1995a,1995b on counterfactual confirmation). 
This method shows that Y makes sense and can be explained "rigorously" as the outcome 
of the causal process of A through C plus X. But "no law of nature enjoined" this Y; and 
any variant of Y emerging from differently configured antecedents would "have been 
equally explicable, though massively different in form and effect" (Gould 1989, p.278,282- 
83,288). 
How do we know if a theorv is true? Relational Realism and Problem-driven Reasoning 
Kuhn showed that knowledge is neither primarily theory-driven (deductive) or data- 
driven (inductive) but problem-driven. This moves us beyond the limited choice of either 
induction or deduction and calls into question the legitimacy of deductivist theory-'centric 
name-calling that attributes "empiricism" and "naive inductivism" to any kind of reasoning 
that is not theory-driven. Recent postKuhnian developments in science studies especially 
cast doubts on an unbalanced theory-driven view of science, knowledge, and the practices 
of inquiry. Whereas theory-driven epistemologies are constructed from idealized 
reconstructions of science, what Hacking (1983, 1992) calls an emphasis on "intervening," 
Pickering (l989,1990,1992a, 1993) stresses as "the temporality of practice", Humphreys 
(1988) "empirical realism," and Bohman (1991) "the new logic of social science," all follow 
Kuhn in rejecting philosophical images in favor of reconstructing the actual histories and 
practices of discoveries in science and the social sciences. The shift entails a move away 
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from philosophical criteria of confirmation to "problems as they emerge in the theories 
and research of scientific practice itself' (Bohman 1991:53). As a result new emphasis has 
been placed on the practical elements of inquiry, and on the diverse criteria that justify 
theories (see especially Pickering 1992). A more experimental and practice-centered view 
of theory confirmation than allowed by the eitherlor of deduction vs induction has thus 
emerged. Testing theories by observing only those phenomena designated by a pre- 
existing hypothesis is only one among a wide variety of avenues along which science leads 
us toward path breaking knowledge, suggesting that the relative import of general theory- 
driven logic has been radically exaggerated (Galison 1987, 1989; Gooding, et. al. 1989; 
Gooding 1992; Pickering 1989,1990, 1992a, 1993). 
Kuhn prefigured the new trend in pointing out that beneath the false alternatives of in- 
duction and deduction there was something called "history" and "articulation" that could 
significantly advance how we understand scientific development. Hacking (1983) has 
been most influential in his elaboration of the notion of articulation. He adopts Kuhn's 
term to represent a more complex bridge between hypotheses and data than the eitherlor 
of deduction or induction (pp. 213-16), and explains it as a more accurate representation 
of the practice in which scientists "create the phenomena which then become the center- 
pieces of theory" (1983:220). Against disproportionate theory-centrism, Hacking (1983:17) 
translates Kuhn's term to mean the history "not of what we think but of what we do ... be- 
cause ... reality has more to do with what we do in the world than with what we think about 
it" (and see OED 1954567). Since then, the historically-forged notion of articulation has 
been widely developed into a full-blown alternative practice-centered conception of theory 
construction in science (see especially Pickering 1992, 1995). In social science, Stin- 
chcombe (1978) foreshadowed this trend when he said that his "argument is that the 
dilemma between synthetic reasoned generality, tested against the facts, and historical 
uniqueness, a portrait of the facts, is a false dilemma. The way out of the dilemma is that 
portraits of the facts, combined with an intellectual operation of carefully drawn 
analogies, are roads to generality" (pp. 115-16, emphasis added). Western (1996) has 
summarized cogently the problem-driven approach as one that involves: a) a willingness 
to make strong use of substantive knowledge to guide assumptions b) admission of the 
heterogeneous sources of uncertainty associated with all data, c) building models to fit 
our substantive problems, and not the other way around. Now that it is increasingly bec- 
oming recognized that the problem-driven approach has "a life of its own"--not reducible 
to either induction or deduction--a disproportionate and singular adherence to deduc- 
tivism can no longer be feasible (see also Humphreys 1992). 
Theorizing convincingly about mechanisms, then, is a task requiring neither pure in- 
duction nor pure deduction but one that requires devising diverse and creative ways (e.g. 
abduction) to answer the question of whether the theoretical entity being hypothesized 
can actually be demonstrated to have a relational effect on a specific problem: Are the 
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mechanisms triggered by Putnam's (1993) differing degrees of social capital really viable 
theorizations for varying patterns of democratization? Only through research practices 
deploying substance-driven comparisons and problem-driven manipulations can we get an 
answer to whether a "theoretical entity" such as social capital actually what Abbott 
(1996:873) calls "causal authority" when he asks: Does something have an "independent 
standing as a site of causation, as a thing with consequences. ..[an ability] to create an effect 
on the rest of the social process that goes beyond effects ... merely transmitted through the 
causing entity from elsewhere" (p.873; emphasis added)? 
TAKING STOCK 
I began by posing a puzzling paradox: How is it possible that K/H's attack on historical 
sociology could have its epistemological roots in a recognizable postKuhnian philosophy 
of science and yet to end up at militant odds with the very incorporation of history that 
Kuhn so eloquently advocated? Let me briefly crystallize the three-part argument through 
which I have addressed this paradox. First, I teased out what were competing interpreta- 
tions of Kuhn's argument and, from these, drew parallel trajectories of two postKuhnian 
realisms--theoretical and relational. Of the two routes out of Kuhn I have examined, the 
dominant one was a "theory-centric" antipositivism that converged with Popper's deduc- 
tivism even while it adamantly refused deductivism's ultimate foundations in the language 
of observation. Deeply opposed to positivism's antirealism, the theory-centric reading of 
Kuhn gave a new lease on life to age-old rationalist epistemology of theoretical realism. 
Given Kuhn's original challenge, the greatest irony is that among the major casualties of 
theory-centrism was history--once again relegated to the status of the "anti-theoretical" 
epistemological "Other" to science. 
The paradox that I have tried to point to throughout is that although anticipated by 
Friedman's defense of predicting from unreal "as if' assumptions, rational choice's non- 
instrumental belief in the reality of its assumptions was a feat only made possible by the 
theory-centric version of the Kuhnian revolution. Once the "theory-laden" (hence suspect) 
character of pure observation had been asserted, not only induction with its ultimate 
foundations in observation but even more so "mere history" became tainted with the label 
of empiricist. With this the way was wide open for theoretical realism to claim a higher 
form of epistemological validity in the power of abstract reason, logic, and first principles. 
To counter with womes about the lack of empirical support for its claims is to be met 
with more dismissals of "empiricism" and "anti-theoreticism," such that drive K/H's argu- 
ment. Rational choice, the theoretical position from which K/H launch their attack, is 
the current foremost standard bearer of theoretical realism's return to the dismissive atti- 
tude toward history that precipitated Kuhn's original challenge. Conceding only that nar- 
rative may be useful for purely "illustrative" purposes, K/H invoke memories of Kuhn's 
critique of any claims to knowledge that limit history to "chronology" and "anecdote. 
Hence the paradox comes full circle in their assault on historical sociology. 
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Second, I have proposed a reading of Kuhn that follows his challenge to liberate "his- 
tory" from its contained status as descriptor, anecdote, or illustration. Adumbrating a his- 
torical epistemology he tried to show that theory must be considered historical in a double 
sense: 1) That what makes a theory true does not and cannot exist outside of the spectrum 
of historically conceivable questions of its time; it is only the questions we ask that bring . 
into existence those theories that compete to be answers and it is only questions that 
transform random facts into confirming evidence. And 2) that for any theory to really pro- 
vide an answer requires a structure of causal linkages and what Tilly later called the thick ' 
sense of history. Concomitantly, this meant that "what is history" could no longer be 
caricatured as random particularities excluded from the domain of true theory, eligible 
only as "anecdotes" or "illustrations." Instead he showed history to bear within it the prob- 
lems that drive all knowledge, and to in turn be the stuff of sequences and relations that 
we can arrange into causal interventions and explanations. 
The third dimension of my argument has thus been to make explicit and to challenge 
the epistemological foundations of K/H's rational choice theory. .With respect to their 
criteria for what counts as an "adequate explanation," K/H: a) use a tautological method- 
ology in which they impute mechanisms to the case at hand from an ontology comprised 
of--mechanisms; b) they confound the rules of covering law model with rational choice's 
rules for mechanisms--hence mixing realism and antirealism with respect to observation 
rules; and c) they confound predictive laws with true causality--thus preempting the very 
process-centered explanation for which they advocate. In considering their criteria for 
justification, we are deserve better reasons for why we should be convinced than merely 
appealing to elegance and parsimony. And with respect to their ontology, the problem is 
not primarily the individualism of their basic unit of analysis, but that they ascribe to this 
individual agent a set of a priori self-contained causal properties that necessarily 
(determi&tically) propel actions independently of its embedded constitutive 
relationships--thus eliminating the contingency and probability now recognized to be es- 
sential in causal theories (Lieberson 1992). K/H thus present a mixture of pre-Kuhnian , 
deductivism and covering law model logic with a postKuhnian theory-centrism and com- 
rnitment to causal mechanisms. In the first instance, they rely explicitly on the authority of 
Hume. The price of starting with Hume, however, is that because Hume insisted that ex- 
perience gives us only particulars and correlations ("constant conjunctions"), one cannot 
say much at all about causal laws except in terms of statistical significance and can noth- 
ing at all about causal mechanisms (except that there aren't any). Since K/H are not will- 
ing to pay this price, they turn to theoretical realism and its claim that what is unobserv- 
able is "real" by virtue of theoretical logic; this gives them license to try a tale about the 
truth of universal and a priori axioms ("general theory") imputed to causality as confirmed 
when its "implications" are confirmed by that same theory. 
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Conclusion 
Kuhn knew the dichotomous caricatures between history and theory would not die 
easily and even suggested that the "main obstacle" to the acceptance of his argument 
would likely be similar to the attacks on his historical thinking that confronted Darwin's 
Origins of Species (1970: 171-72). That the chief interpretation of Kuhn today is as a "rela- 
tivist" today confirms just how right he was. Twenty years later, Stinchcombe (1978) 
recommended that the social sciences follow a path similar to Kuhn's: "There is nothing 
so likely to cause a misreading of this argument [of history vs theory being a false 
dichotomy] as twisting it back into the psychology of generality that it rejects. The Kantian 
versus Nietzsche (or positivist versus Dilthey) version of what epistemology is all about is 
so embedded in the historical origins of social science that an argument based on the sup- 
position that this is the wrong question has a hard time trying to say what it is about (p. 
116)." Although recent work in the philosophy of science would suggest that the "historic 
turn" in science is making it impossible for theorists to play the science card any more in 
criticizing history, K/H's attack on historical sociology as "antitheoretical" is but the latest 
manifestation of just how hard it is to say what an historical epistemology is about. Trun- 
dling out the same tired caricatures of both history and theory, they prove just how in- 
tractable the false dichotomies are, and as indefensible now as they have ever been. Para- 
doxically, the result is that two leading historical sociologists are taking us right back to 
the anti-historical position that Kuhn originally challenged--free now, apparently, as 'post- 
Kuhnians" from the discipline of observation with which positivism was burdened. But 
positivism burdened itself for good reason with the discipline of the empirical--to escape 
the tyranny of arbitrary dogma and prejudice. In the absence of this discipline, the appeal 
to "theory" can be as much a mystification as the blunt sword of "empiricism." The 
theoretical world that rational choice theory inhabits may well be, as K/H's claim, "par- 
simonious" "bold," even elegant; but we are owed, nonetheless, justification for believing 
in it. 
K/H are quick to scrutinize and condemn the errors of historical sociologists. They 
have been less quick to examine and question how their own epistemological strictures 
have histories, histories not of refinement towards greater absolute tmth, but rather his- 
tories of contestation -- histories not unlike those that both they and we study. Un- 
fortunately, the histories that constitute some of our most important and sigrzlficant ex- 
planatory rules are often completely invisible (Lieberson 1992); they have been natural- 
ized to the point where K/H are able to get away with confounding the formal logic of 
epistemology with the specificities of rational choice theory--thus making impossible any 
open debate over methodology--and then privilege theoretical realism over "mere his- 
tory." They have in effect closed out the constructive benefits of engagement among rival 
positions (being forced to clarify presuppositions, broaden purview etc.) and averted the 
di££icult questions of intents, purposes, and consequences of social science more generally. 
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But the consequences of their imperial claims are ironic: Kiser and Hechter have once 
again reminded us of the post-positivist "fact" that all facts are "theory-laden," and that 
histories are organized by theoretical categories. But shouldn't K/H wonder if their own 
evaluative criteria are themselves not history-laden, and thus contingent and embedded in 
a larger field of less angelic, more pluralist, possibilities? 
3 
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cussion. Drafts have been improved by the comments of partici ants at seminars at the P University.of Chicago, and Northwestern University, as well as rom many colleagues 
along the way, including Julia Adams, Renee Ans ach, Mabel Berezin, Fred Block, P Mustafa Emirbayer, Paula England, Walter Gold rank, Martin Hollis, Ira Katznelson, 
Steven Lukes, John McCormick, Mark Mizruchi, John Padgett, Alessandro Pizzorno, 
Moishe Postone, Sonya Rose, William Sewell, Arpad Skakolczai, Marc Steinberg, George 
Steinmetz, Arthur Stinchcombe, Wolfgang Streeck, Charles Tilly, Bruce Western, Xu Xie, 
Mayer Zald, the anonymous reviewers, and the AJS editor. I thank especially Elizabeth 
Anderson, without whom this project would not have been possible. Financial support 
during the research and wtiting has been provided generously from the University of 
Michigan's Rackham Faculty Research Grant and Fellowship, the Office of the Vice- 
President for Research, and the LSA Faculty Assistance Fund, as well as from the Euro- 
pean University Institute, Florence, Italy. 
2. I say the "current" epistemological foundations with full awareness (as I point out inter 
alia) that the roots of RCT go back to 17th~. rationalism, 18th-19th century classical 
political economy, 20th~. neo-classical economics and decision theory, etc. My argument, 
however, is not an intellectual history but one addressing the epistemological conditions 
of possibility for its present resurgence--and these are absolutely post-Kuhnian. 
3. If there is need for any further support for the longstanding epistemological link be- 
tween the problem of observability characteristic of mechanisms and convincingly 
demonstrating true causality among scientists, consider that in October 1996 it is front 
page headline news in the International Herald Tribune that a "mechanism" has been dis- 
covered that actually demonstrates that "for the first time" that smoking "causes lung can- 
cer" (IHT, Oct. 16, 1996:l). 
4. My thinking about these issues has been enriched enormously through discussions with 
Martin Hollis as well as his own wonderful book on the topic (1994). 
5. Kuhn's was not a lone voice among philosophers; he was in the tradition of Duhem 
(1954 [1906]), Koyre (1957), Quine (1963,1969); M. Polanyi (1958), and Hanson (1958). 
Why Kuhn broke through to a wider audience is a question for the sociology of knowledge 
(but see Alexander (1982). Kuhn himself famously disclaimed any implications for the so- 
cial sciences. 
6. "[Olften the paradigm theory is implicated directly in the design of apparatus able to 
solve the problem" (Kuhn 1970:27). 
7. We also do so to avoid suffering a complete "epistemological crisis" at every 
decision-juncture in our daily intellectual life (MacIntryre 1980). 
8. Hacking (1983), for instance, tells us of radio astronomers Penzias and Wilson who in 
1965 experimented on what they thought might be a meaningless phenomenon (because 
they were not hypothesis-testing) but which held intrinsic interest to them--namely the 
static found in transatlantic radio. After considerable experimentaion, they determined 
that there was a uniform amount of energy in space. Meanwhile, physicists at Bell Labs 
were theorizing about what came to be called the Big Bang theory. Only the discovery of 
the experimental tests--conducted completely independently of any hypotheses about the 
origins of the earth--could confirm the theorists' speculation of a uniform temporature 
throughout space. They found it in the work of Penzio and Wilson--among the few exper- 
imenters in physics to have been given a Nobel Prize. Yet when the story appeared in 
text-books it was rewritten to confirm to a theory-dominated one in which the experi- 
menters were represented as merely testing the already extant hypotheses of the theorists 
(pp. 159-161). 
9. 'The primacy of theory," after all, would hardly in itself be a revolutionary position, al- 
ways having been the rallying cry of deductivists (e.g. Popper 1959). 
10. The concept of an historical epistemology is discussed in Somers 
(l990,1995a,b,1996) and Somers and Gibson (1994). One reviewer makes the suggestion 
that the term epistemology is too tied up with its own origins in the search for the 
transhistorical grounds for knowled e to be coherently coupled with "historical." While I 
appreciate the historical accuracy o f the comment, a useful distinction nonetheless can be 
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made between epistemology in the generic sense--sim ly the study or the question of how P we determine what counts as knowledge, regardless o how that question is answered--and 
the specific rules of positivist epistemology that have indeed long been dominant (see 
Rorty 1979). Nothing in my argument suggests that I am a historicist--in the sense of 
believing that concepts only have meaning in their original specific contexts; rather, be- 
cause I believe that the question of knowledge is a generic question to which all theories 
must be accountable, I find it justified to distinguish a generic and abstract use of 
epistemology from the history of one particular version of epistemology. Indeed I find the 
potential contradiction of history and epistemology to be usefully jarring, as evidenced in 
my prefacing the term as "purposefully oxyrnoronic"--something I develop at much greater 
length in Somers (1995a,b, 1996a), 
11 Inductive-statistical (I-S) methodologies share a commitment to the deductive form of 
the covering law model of explanation. 
12. Although its strict epistemological legitimacy has been considerably diminished in 
recent philosophical argument (Salmon 1988; Miller 1987; Cartwright 1983; Outhwaite 
1988), as Steinmetz (forthcoming) points out, a "watered-down" version is still dominant 
within American sociology. Its methods courses, statistics textbooks, and articles in lead- 
ing journals all point to the same basic concept of theory as "constant conjunctions of 
events" and empirical generalizations expressed as universal statements of the covering 
law type (p.3). See especially King et.al. (1992), Turner (1992), Wacquant (1993). 
13. Gould (1989) and MacIntyre (1980) each capture the elegance of this approach, al- 
beit in very different ways. 
14. "Newton saw apples fall with his eyes but the force and law of gravity are not to be 
perceived (Hollis 1994:4). 
15. Although I discuss below the ways in which rational choice's theoretical realism with 
its belief in the truth of theories differs significantly from Friedman's instrumental "as if' 
approach to theoretical assumptions. 
16. Steinmetz (forthcoming) has made the reasonable criticism that he sees no compell- 
ing reason for why Bhaskar's "critical realism" is not an an adequate term for the kind of 
realism I call relational and pragmatic. Although I generally don't endorse the prolifera- 
tion of neologisms, in this case I find myself enough at odds with Bhaskar's belief that 
causality is found in an entity's essential properties to require an explicit recognition of the 
relational dimension in my concept of realism. 
17. Bertrand Russell once described the law of causality as "a relic of a bygone age" (cited 
in Entrikin 1991:llO); Popper (1959) dismissed Weber as naive for not recognizing that 
causality can only be a feature of universal laws (p.722). 
18. There are other reasons to object to the necessity of mechanisms; for the most power- 
ful, see Stinchcombe (1991). What K/H really mean is that there is a consensus over the 
need for mechanisms among RCT theorists (e.g. Coleman 1990; Elster 1989). The mis- 
take is not an accident since they use "theory" synonomously with RCT. 
19. The locus classicus on "reasons as causes" is Hempel's "Rational Action" (1962). For 
discussion see Davidson (1980), Dray (1957), Rosenberg (1988), and Bohman (1991). 
20. As RCT theorizes, there will of course be constraints and counter-forces that might 
present an obstacle in any given empirical example; but they will be just that--external 
constraints on a natural force. Hence the ceteris paribus clause. The example of brittleness 
is found in Bohman (1991:20). 
21. Tilly (1995a: 1595) spells out precisely the inexorable and tautological progression of 
this structure of explanation: "1) assume a coherent, durable, self-propelling social unit; 2) 
attribute a general condition or process to that unit; 3) invoke or invent an invariant 
model of that condition or process; 4) explain the behavior of the unit on the basis of its 
conformity to that invariant model." This is Tilly's characterization of standard ways "to 
explain political processesw--not one that he applies specifically to theoretical realism. 
Yet it captures especially well the post-positivist deductivism of rational choice. 
22. Since that writing, rational choice theorists have discovered narrative--but only 
endorse a theory-driven version. See Bates et. al. (1997), Kiser (1996). 
23. What counts as causal unity is an empirical question and so can change over the 
course of research. Very often one starts with common sense causal unities, e.g. people 
have intentions, that with additional information can be transformed or extended to less 
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common sensical ones, e.g. firms have intentions. 
24. Putnam (1993), for example, would disagree. After extensively testing he decided 
that the roots are the critical explanation, just as Somers (1994) was able to demonstrate 
after testing three competing hypotheses that the long term one focusing on legal founda- 
tions was determinative. And for a very long-run analysis, see Tilly (1990). 
25. 'The richer and more comprehensive the underlying ontology,the better the theory" 
(P-446)- 
26. Tilly is hardly alone in recognizing the centrality of ontological assumptions on meth- 
odology, e.g. .  Alexander 1982, Archer 1988, Giddens 1984, and of course all of the litera- 
ture on realism. 
27. Among the most important are Anderson (1993), Block (1991), Hollis (1995), Green 
and Shapiro (1994), Pizzorno (1986,1991,199), and White (1992). Two powerful recent 
critiques applied to specific areas are Adarns (forthcoming), and Kim and Bearman 
(1997). 
\ - -  - - / -  
28. Althou the unqualified success of Green and Shapiro (1994) is to show that rational 
choice has P ailed empirically in at least three of the most important areas it has theorized 
in political science. See also Friedman (1996). 
29. Rejecting the either/or between individualism and holism, between agency and 
structure--but without resorting to the "mutuality" compromise--relational realism thus 
finds an analytic home in network theory (Bearman 1993, Bearman and Deane 1992; 
Breiger 1991; Burt 1980,1992; Laumam, Marsden, Prensky 1983; Padgett and Ansell 
1993; Wellman 1988; White, et. al. 1975; White 1992,1993,1996; Wellman 1988), narra- 
tive/sequence analysis (Abbott 1992a, 1992b,1995; Aminzade 1992,1993; Griffin 1992, 
1993; Somers 1994q1996a; Steinmetz 1992; Stinchcombe 1978; Tilly 1995a,b,c), space- 
time structures (Aminzade 1992; Sewell 1996; Wallerstein 1991), relational identities 
I Pizzorno 1991,1986; Somers 1992,1994b; Tilly 1984,1995; White 1992), configurations Skcopol 1984; Tilly 1984, 1988), and historical institutionalism (Steinrno et.al. 1992; 
March and Olsen 1990) each of which fits loosely under the general rubric of what Emir- 
bayer (1996) has recently declared to be a relational sociology. 
30. Paradoxically, that mechanisms cannot be deduced from laws is also the argument of 
Elster (1989); and see also Sorners (1996a). 
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